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Editor’s Introduction
We are very excited to be entering the second volume year of Genocide Studies and
Prevention. Our first three issues were diverse and contained some of the most
important new research in the field. As we enter our second year, and publish our first
issue of volume 2, we hope to continue that tradition.
Broadly speaking, GSP 2:1 focuses on the prevention of genocide. The lead article,
by Thomas Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science and Director of the Ralph
Bunche Institute for International Studies at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York, examines genocide prevention in the real world of politics.
Weiss points out that, ‘‘except for the label, the responses of the international
community of states to Rwanda and Sudan were comparable.’’ He notes that ‘‘perhaps,
as Scott Straus has argued in these pages, we have invested too much time and energy
in parsing the ‘G-word.’’’
In this sense Weiss is a perfect supplement to David Scheffer’s arguments,
originally published in GSP 1:3, concerning the need for a new category of crime.
Weiss, however, is interested more in making genocide prevention a political reality
than in changing the definition of the crime. His article, as he notes, ‘‘explores the
chasm between norms and practice for both military and civilian humanitarians.’’
Weiss looks at what he calls ‘‘five impediments to human protection in genocidal
contexts: resistance from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); blow-back from 9/11;
a distracted superpower; spoilers, war economies, and privatization; and the civilian
humanitarian identity crisis itself.’’
All these, Weiss argues, constitute a threat to ‘‘international order and justice.’’
He points out how, in most instances, civilians under attack or under siege in war
zones want intervention, yet rhetoric continues to replace action and the dead
and dying continue to wait. It is this waiting and lack of action that motivated
David Scheffer, US ambassador at large for war crimes issues from 1997 through 2001
and currently the Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw/Robert B. Helman Professor of Law and
director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University,
in the lead article of GSP 1:3, to issue an exciting and interesting call for a new genre
of human-rights crimes. The Scheffer article may be found in GSP 1:3 and online at
http://utpjournals.metapress.com.
Scheffer argues that the term ‘‘genocide’’ imposes limitations on action to protect
human rights, and he calls for a new category of international law, ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
The purpose here, he argues, is to ‘‘simplify and yet render more accurate both the
public dialogue and legal terminology describing genocide and other atrocity crimes.’’
Since the editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention found Scheffer’s proposal so
interesting and innovative, we invited some of the leading scholars in the study of
genocide to comment on his presentation. In the lead commentary, William Schabas,
a professor of human rights law at the National University of Ireland, Galway, and
director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, closely examines Scheffer’s proposal.
Schabas points out that similar ideas have been floated earlier but never appeared to
gain support. He proceeds to argue that ‘‘there are many recent developments favoring
this drive for greater coherence and more simplicity.’’
Schabas notes that the international tribunals, in fact, have pointed in the
same direction and that, for example, ‘‘with rare exceptions, every ‘atrocity’ committed
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized as both a war crime and a crime against
humanity.’’ After outlining the conclusion of the United Nations commission of inquiry
into Darfur, which did not find that genocide was committed but did say that ‘‘crimes
against humanity appeared to have been committed and that there was no reason to
think that this made the matter any less serious,’’ Schabas moves on to point out that
‘‘on the political level, there is also a marked tendency toward consolidation of the
categories of international crime.’’
Schabas appears to believe that ‘‘Scheffer’s proposal may well be an idea whose time
has come.’’ He traces the historical evolution of the concepts discussed by Scheffer and
analyzes and explicates an important distinction between ‘‘crimes against humanity’’
and ‘‘genocide.’’ In this very important analysis, which space precludes my recounting,
he also points out why there was no ‘‘Convention on Crimes against Humanity.’’
Schabas notes that this ‘‘gap in international law was really only closed with
the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in July 1998.’’
Schabas further notes that at the end of the 1940s we could see the ‘‘very clear
beginnings of the elaborate system of international humanitarian law that we know
today.’’ It was, he contends, ‘‘characterized by drastic limitations with respect to
definitions of crimes and the obligations they imposed,’’ and the evolution of these is
the underpinning of Scheffer’s proposal. Schabas believes that the ‘‘logical consequence
of Scheffer’s suggestion may be to abandon altogether the use of the terms ‘genocide,’
‘crimes against humanity,’ and ‘war crimes.’’’ In fact, Schabas notes that ‘‘in terms of
international law, Scheffer is absolutely right.’’
Schabas concludes that the term ‘‘genocide’’ will not disappear and states that his
‘‘preference would be to restrict the definition of genocide in order to ensure its
stigma.’’
The second commentary, by Martha Minow, a professor of law at Harvard
University, begins by agreeing with what Minow calls ‘‘Scheffer’s thoughtful and
practical call for separating the political and legal uses of ‘genocide’ and for devising
the broader categories of ‘atrocity crimes’ for public communication about genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.’’
Pointing out how Scheffer’s frustration with the existing categories must have
motivated his effort, Minow notes that ‘‘the problems that he addresses will not be
cured with new words, and it is a matter of some interest that a person of Scheffer’s
wisdom and expertise would put his emphasis in that direction.’’ Minow raises three
main issues with Scheffer’s proposal. First, she argues that ‘‘renaming legal categories
will do little to address underlying problems of leadership and will.’’ Second, ‘‘for public
communication, the term ‘atrocity crime’ loses the specificity of ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes
against humanity’ without offering clarity in return’’; third, ‘‘doing something to
get people to think and act is crucial.’’ She elaborates each of these issues and provides
an entirely interesting critique.
Sévane Garibian, a PhD candidate in law at the University of Paris, begins her
commentary by pointing out that Scheffer’s separation of ‘‘the criminal character of
genocide from its political reality is appealing.’’ Garibian, however, proposes to reverse
Scheffer’s proposal and to focus on the ‘‘legal application of intervention—as a tool
for prevention.’’ She notes that she feels ‘‘uneasy’’ with Scheffer’s distinction between
‘‘a legal and a political application of the concept of genocide.’’ She believes that the
‘‘legal definition is, and should remain, applicable in all cases’’ and that intervention
to prevent genocide should be determined by what she refers to as ‘‘a sharper legal
understanding of intervention.’’
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After elaborating her arguments, Garibian turns her attention to Scheffer’s
proposal to create a new category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law.’’ Here she
argues that there are two main reasons to support Scheffer’s proposal because,
in her terms, it ‘‘reflects the spirit underlying the codification work done by both the
International Law Commission (ILC) and the drafters of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) statute.’’ She outlines four ways in which this is the case and concludes
her analysis by arguing that intervention remains an important and controversial
issue that cannot be brushed aside by reference to a new category of international
crime. Garibian notes that ‘‘support for the international implementation of minimum
human rights in the face of severe governmental abuses and criminality should not
disguise the risk of a postcolonial revival of interventionary diplomacy.’’
Michael J. Bazyler, professor of law and the ‘‘1939’’ Club Law Scholar in Holocaust
and Human Rights Studies at Whittier Law School, places Scheffer’s proposal in the
tradition of Raphael Lemkin and others who followed him in attempting to eradicate
what Bazyler calls a ‘‘great blot on both international law and international
diplomacy’’—the fact that ‘‘we have failed miserably to make [Lemkin’s] dream into
reality and relegate genocide to the trash bin of history.’’ Bazyler points out that
we have tried and that ‘‘numerous proposals—some put into practice—have been
offered for the last fifty years to make the work of genocide prevention more effective.
The topic has also been the subject of numerous books, articles, policy papers,
and speeches.’’
Bazyler catalogues some of the most prominent of these, from Charny and
Rappoport’s proposed early warning system through Gregory Stanton’s stages of
genocide and Kofi Annan’s creation of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, and notes that the ongoing events in Darfur highlight the frustration
and continued lack of effectiveness in prevention of genocide. Scheffer’s proposal is,
Bazyler points out, another in this long line of proposals ‘‘to make genocide prevention
more effective.’’
Bazyler agrees with Scheffer’s contention that the ‘‘legal definition of genocide, as
found in the UNCG, has acted as a constraint to genocide prevention.’’ Yet he believes
that ‘‘if a historical event, including those occurring before the enactment of the
UNCG, bears substantial similarity to events already recognized as genocide—
whether it be the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide—the term ‘genocide’ must be
used to describe that event.’’ He notes, however, that it is in the political arena that,
‘‘on purely practical grounds, Scheffer’s suggestion that the use of the ‘G-word’ is best
avoided is sound.’’
Bazyler also thinks that the use of the term ‘‘atrocity’’ helps as a means to
categorize genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and is a useful tool that
substitutes one word for a series of ‘‘complex and hard-to-understand legal meanings.’’
Bazyler notes, importantly, that, as Scheffer points out, the fact that the term
‘‘atrocity’’ has no legal meaning gives it an ‘‘advantage over the term ‘genocide,’ since
its use by politicians and diplomats does not trigger any legal ramifications.’’
Finally, Bazyler—accurately, I believe—thinks that ‘‘it remains to be seen whether
the term will catch on, either in the international diplomatic arena or with legal
scholars, the media, and the general public.’’
Martin Mennecke, a doctoral candidate in international law at the University of
Kiel, Germany, follows up the linguistic analysis by asking whether using or not using
the ‘‘G-word’’ contributes to the prevention of genocide. Mennecke points out how
genocide has found its way into international law and the academic community, noting
3
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that the field of genocide studies has expanded rapidly, so that there are
‘‘two international organizations of genocide scholars, four international journals,
and a fast-growing number of related university courses around the world.’’ Yet, he
points out, ‘‘genocide as a crime does not seem to end.’’ In particular, he notes the
discussion of whether or not the events in Darfur fit the definition of genocide. This
brings him to Scheffer’s proposals, which he finds ‘‘both timely and interesting.’’ They
are timely, Mennecke argues, ‘‘because over the last years much has been written
about the genocide-related jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, but little light has
been shed on the meaning of the genocide label and determination for issues of
intervention and prevention.’’ Moreover, he notes, Scheffer’s proposals are interesting
‘‘because he does not give in to the usual reflex of genocide scholars to simply criticize
the legal definition of genocide; instead, he attempts to increase the practical
applicability of the concept of genocide to international politics.’’ Mennecke examines
Scheffer’s proposals not from the perspective of international law but from the
‘‘perspective of genocide prevention.’’ His basic argument is that ‘‘Scheffer’s suggestion
to use the formula ‘precursors of genocide’ repeats the mistakes decision makers
and scholars have made with respect to the genocide in Rwanda and the conflict
in Darfur. To follow Scheffer’s advice outside the research community would be
counterproductive and keep genocide prevention inadvertently in what could be called
the ‘G-word trap’—that is, a misplaced focus on whether a conflict is genocide or not.’’
Finally, however, Mennecke does ‘‘fully endorse Scheffer’s concept of atrocity law as
a welcome tool to reconceptualize genocide as forming a broader category of massive
human-rights violations instead of being in its own league.’’ In fact, Mennecke wishes
to go further than Scheffer: he argues that, ‘‘within the context of genocide prevention,
the label ‘genocide’ should be avoided altogether; using a term such as ‘atrocity crimes’
would benefit attempts to prevent genocide.’’ In an important explanation of the utility
of Scheffer’s idea of ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ Mennecke points out that the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo has not received nearly the attention devoted to Darfur,
possibly because the focus in Darfur has been on labeling the conflict as ‘‘genocide.’’
If, however, a new category of crime, ‘‘atrocity crime,’’ became as well known as
‘‘genocide,’’ it would not matter whether or not a conflict fit the definition of genocide,
and attention could be focused on doing something to stop the killing in conflicts, such
as that in the DRC, where genocide is not charged. Moreover, the use of the concept of
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ could very well evade the excruciating questions of genocidal intent,
as discussed in the UNCG. This conceivably might, as Mennecke suggests, lower the
‘‘very high threshold for genocide (i.e., that the perpetrator has the intent not only
to carry out the acts described in the legal definition of genocide, but to do so with
a view to destroy, in whole or in part, the group to which the victim belongs).’’
He concludes that we should all start thinking that ‘‘what matters is not the ‘G-word’
but the ‘A-word’—atrocity crimes.’’
Up to this point, with some minor exceptions, our commentaries have been very
supportive of Scheffer’s overall proposals. Payam Akhavan, in ‘‘Proliferation of
Terminology and the Illusion of Progress,’’ and Mark Levene, in ‘‘David Scheffer’s
‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes’: A Response,’’ bring to their analyses a more critical
perspective, raising questions about Scheffer’s ideas.
Akhavan, associate professor in the Faculty of Law at McGill University,
argues that ‘‘as scholars and advocates, we are formidable taxonomists and explorers
of distinctions, ever probing new conceptual frontiers in the elusive quest to render
an overwhelming universe of human struggle more coherent and manageable.’’
4

Editor’s Introduction

This is the theoretical background for his primary criticism of Scheffer as pursuing
a ‘‘proliferation of terminology’’ that, Akhavan argues, ‘‘can often become a
self-contained exercise in creating the mere illusion of progress.’’ Moreover,
he continues, ‘‘in some circumstances, it can even divert precious resources away
from the consolidation of existing hard-won norms and institutions.’’ In fact, he points
out that before wholeheartedly accepting Scheffer’s substitution of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
for ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘we need to ask whether the cost-benefit calculus of promoting this
new concept and purported discipline justifies a significant commitment of energy
and resources.’’ Akhavan doubts that this is a useful exercise, expressing ‘‘misgivings
about the relative weight and importance that Scheffer assigns to ‘atrocity crimes’
as a useful instrument for promoting this cause.’’
If I read Akhavan correctly, his elaboration of his argument with reference to the
ongoing ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur and the earlier ‘‘genocide’’ in Rwanda leads him to worry
that substituting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ for ‘‘genocide’’ might ‘‘actually undermine’’ the
perceived importance of the ongoing violence and lessen the likelihood of intervention.
Rather, in Akhavan’s view, ‘‘what we need most is not a conceptual or rhetorical magic
bullet but, rather, greater focus on integrating and mainstreaming existing concepts
and institutions in the daily habits and rituals of decision makers, with a view to
transforming an entrenched culture of reaction into a culture of prevention.’’
In conclusion, Akahavan asks why it is necessary to ‘‘reinvent the wheel when
existing concepts are more than adequate.’’ He is very eloquent in his criticism
of ‘‘placing faith in abstractions.’’ His second-to-last paragraph merits particular
attention:
We should also consider whether placing faith in abstractions as a means of inducing
the will to act, especially among the wider public, overlooks the vital role of emotional
connection with the stark horror of such situations, where rational
normative schemes are certainly not at the forefront of people’s minds. When looking
at bodies littering the hills of Rwanda or Darfur, is it the schematic labeling that
arouses indignation and empathy, or the intimate face of suffering? Is our inordinate
faith in intellectual concepts and terms and concepts not a privileging of distance over
intimacy, inadvertently placing abstractions over engagement? Is the more powerful
form of cognition in this context not emotional rather than rational? Is it not the
unspeakability of such evil, the ineffability of intense human suffering, that speaks
most loudly to our conscience? The voices of survivors, the cruel reality of hatred and
violence, are more potent than any term that we could devise in our rarified midst as
scholars and advocates.

In the final commentary, Mark Levene, professor of history at Southampton
University, approaches Scheffer’s proposals in a different and stimulating fashion.
Levene notes that he is skeptical, to put it mildly, of what he calls ‘‘Lemkinesque
assumptions as to the development of strengthened juridical instruments aimed at
buttressing existing international law, or in military intervention against violators.’’
In fact, he argues that genocide is ‘‘bound up with the conflicts and tensions of the
broader international political economy,’’ and this means that it cannot be isolated or
treated ‘‘without respect . . . to a wider and more holistic epidemiology of violence in the
modern world.’’ He proceeds to note that ‘‘prevention of genocide, if we are to arrive
there at all, thus, in my reckoning, requires not only a much broader engagement
with the systemic sources of conflict in the contemporary world but a paradigmatic
shift in our approach to the fundamentals of human life on this planet.’’
Stating forthrightly his critique of the general field of ‘‘genocide studies,’’ if such
a thing exists, Levene proceeds to engage Scheffer and note how he bridges,
5
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or attempts to bridge, the ‘‘gap between the legal and political arenas.’’
Levene, therefore, acknowledges that he finds ‘‘Scheffer’s formulations—in their own
terms—perfectly logical and internally consistent.’’
This noted, he proceeds to point out that he continues to harbor ‘‘fundamental
disagreements with Scheffer’s operating premises,’’ though he does ‘‘welcome’’
Scheffer’s attempt to overcome the more ‘‘hidebound,’’ ‘‘inflexible,’’ ‘‘legalistic’’
formulations that have characterized the approach of international lawyers.
Levene, like no other commentator in this collection, points out very clearly, and in
my view accurately, that when we speak of a ‘‘response by the international
community to genocide and atrocity more generally, what Scheffer really means are
the hegemonic elements in this community.’’ He interjects into the discussion an entire
realm of politics often ignored by international lawyers, as well as other scholars who
write about genocide. Levene’s astute criticism even of some of the examples used by
Scheffer, in particular the case of Kosovo, highlights the gap between a critical
perception of international politics and a narrower, legalistic perception. History is
often misperceived, if not rewritten, to highlight the legal example used by the legal
scholar to prove a point.
Levene, in short, adopts what might be called a ‘‘global,’’ systemic, or more holistic
view of genocide. As he notes, the indicators of genocide, those identified by Scheffer
as well as others, must be understood ‘‘in terms of deep, systemic factors, which—as
in the case of the Sahelian desertification—are being driven by a variety of regional,
but increasingly global, factors, above all anthropogenic climate change, which, of
course, would demand of us an entirely more far-reaching project for saving the people
of the Sahel (and the planet entire)’’; or, he continues, ‘‘do we only want to see
precursors in such a way that it allows us—the West, the international community,
whatever you want to call it—to deal simply with the most immediate effects, thereby,
of course, putting to one side the deepest-set, and much more endemic, issues at
stake?’’ Elaborating further these systemic issues, Levene concludes as follows:
‘‘Scheffer’s formulations, in short, are neat, elegant, and concise, but the assumption
that legal formulas can somehow create the framework for the political prevention of
mass violence in the twenty-first century is another example of looking at the problem
through the wrong end of the telescope.’’
David Scheffer responds to his critics in ‘‘The Merits of Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity
Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity Law.’’’ He points out that he is not, as some of the commentators
suggest, seeking a ‘‘magic bullet’’ that will miraculously end atrocity crimes, but that
action is influenced by words—and it is, after all, action to prevent genocide that is
most important. Addressing each commentator in turn, Scheffer concludes that his
attempt to ‘‘fix the terminological chaos in the realm of atrocities is an endeavor
I gladly undertake.’’ We, the editors, also think it is a useful endeavor, and we thank
Professor Scheffer and all those who have contributed to this interesting exchange.
The editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention are very pleased to offer this broad
array of commentary on the proposals of David Scheffer. The commentators raise most,
if not all, of the most relevant issues confronting those who wish to end the ongoing
cruelty that continues to besiege this beleaguered planet. While there are no quick
and easy solutions offered here, there are important issues addressed, and that,
after all, is a step in the right direction.
Herb Hirsch
Co-editor
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Halting Genocide: Rhetoric versus Reality
Thomas G. Weiss
Presidential Professor of Political Science and Director of the
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The Graduate
Center of The City University of New York
The chasm between normative development and international practice regarding
humanitarian intervention is wide, as evidenced by the ongoing genocide in Darfur.
Rarely are political reality and pious rhetoric in sync. Depicting the normative
development on a graph would reflect a steady growth since the early 1990s,
whereas the curve depicting the operational capacity and political will to engage in
humanitarian intervention would resemble the path of a roller coaster. This article
examines the trajectory of norm building about military intervention for human
protection purposes, emphasizing the concept of the ‘‘responsibility to protect.’’
While considerable progress has been made toward resolving the fundamental
tension between the principles of state sovereignty and human rights, the actual
practice of military humanitarianism has reached a nadir at present. The
article highlights five impediments to human protection in genocidal contexts:
the resistance from the Non-Aligned Movement; the blowback from 9/11;
a distracted superpower; spoilers, war economies, and privatization; and the
civilian humanitarian identity crisis itself.

In the midst of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the world’s powers cloaked their
non-reactions in a semantic fog about ‘‘genocide.’’ Their refusal to invoke the term
provided an excuse for standing idle in the face of mass murder. A decade later, the US
House of Representatives followed the lead of Secretary of State Colin Powell and
voted unanimously to label as genocide the killings and forced migration in Darfur.
The use of the term for Khartoum’s actions, however, triggered a collective yawn and
did nothing to protect those under siege from Sudanese government troops and the
Janjaweed. Thus, except for the label, the responses by the international community of
states to Rwanda and Sudan were comparable. Perhaps, as Scott Straus has argued in
these pages,1 we have invested too much time and energy in parsing the ‘‘G-word.’’
Not only has military action for human protection faltered, but civilian
humanitarians are also in the midst of an ‘‘identity crisis.’’ The changing nature of
warfare has challenged their traditional operating principles; indeed, old modes have
had un-humanitarian consequences, particularly in the context of the ‘‘new wars.’’ Aid
agencies fed the killers who had perpetrated the Rwandan genocide but had then
moved to refugee camps located in then Zaı̈re, thereby facilitating further acts of
violence—just one example of David Kennedy’s ‘‘dark sides of virtue.’’2
This article explores the chasm between norms and practice for both military
and civilian humanitarians. The increased support for an international
responsibility to protect (R2P), as evident in the approval by the September 2005
World Summit,3 confronts the atrocities in Sudan, northern Uganda, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While states have failed to provide
military resources to protect those caught in the crossfire of war, aid agencies have
Thomas G. Weiss, ‘‘Halting Genocide: Rhetoric versus Reality.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention
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struggled to adapt to contemporary wars, but with little evidence of effective learning
about modifying the humanitarian impulse to ‘‘do no harm.’’ The article also examines
five impediments to human protection in genocidal contexts: resistance from the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the blowback from 9/11; a distracted superpower;
spoilers, war economies, and privatization; and the civilian humanitarian identity
crisis itself.

Military Humanitarianism: Normative Progress
A remarkable development of the post–Cold War era has been the use of military force
to protect human beings trapped in the throes of war. With the possible exception of
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG),4 no normative idea has moved faster in the international arena than The
Responsibility to Protect, the 2001 report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).5 At the same time, the inability to
protect many besieged populations starkly highlights the dramatic disconnect between
political reality and pious rhetoric.
Indeed, the two are rarely in sync. Sometimes norm entrepreneurs
scramble to keep up with political reality, and sometimes they are ahead of the
curve. In this case, depicting normative development on a graph would reflect
a steady growth since the early 1990s, whereas the curve depicting the operational
capacity and political will to engage in humanitarian intervention would resemble
the path of a roller coaster. Hence, the US-led and UN-approved intervention in
northern Iraq in 1991 took place largely without any formal discussion of moral
justifications. In spite of continual fireworks in debates about international responses
to conscience-shocking events, from Central Africa to the Balkans, the World Summit
on the United Nations’ sixtieth anniversary represented the zenith of international
normative consensus about R2P. At the same time, the blowback from 9/11 and the
war on terror and in Iraq resulted in a nadir in the actual practice of humanitarian
intervention.

Sovereignty as Responsibility and Kofi Annan’s ‘‘Two Sovereignties’’
Two intellectual efforts prior to convening the ICISS broke new ground between state
sovereignty and human rights and provided the underpinnings of The Responsibility to
Protect. First was the normative work of Francis M. Deng and Roberta Cohen on the
issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which directly confronted the behavior of
states toward their own citizens. Second was UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s
activism on behalf of human rights and his efforts to promote individual alongside
state sovereignty.
Concerned to protect IDPs as an ever-increasing category of war victim, Deng and
Cohen reframed sovereignty. First articulated in the 1980s, their ‘‘sovereignty as
responsibility’’ stipulated that when states are unable to provide life-supporting
protection and assistance for their citizens, they are expected to request and accept
outside offers of aid.6 Should they refuse or deliberately obstruct access to their
displaced or other affected populations and thereby put large numbers of them at risk,
there is an international responsibility to respond. Sovereignty entails accountability
to two separate constituencies: internally to one’s own population and internationally
to the community of responsible states in the form of compliance with human-rights
and humanitarian agreements. Proponents argue that sovereignty is not absolute but
8
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contingent. When a government massively abuses the fundamental rights of its
citizens, its sovereignty is temporarily suspended.
The second key intellectual contribution came from Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
who, more than his predecessors, took human rights seriously and preached sermons
about humanitarian intervention from his bully pulpit. With the help of his scribe,
Edward Mortimer, a series of speeches in 1998 and 1999 placed the issue squarely on
the intergovernmental agenda.7
Annan’s black-and-white challenge to traditional state sovereignty reflects a
change in the balance between states and people as the source of legitimacy and
authority. Like Deng and Cohen, Annan sought to broaden the concept of sovereignty
to encompass both the rights and the responsibilities of states. The secretary-general’s
clarion call was hard to muffle, especially after The Economist published his ‘‘two
concepts of sovereignty’’ in September 1999:
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined . . . States are now widely
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa . . . When
we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect
individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.8

Later that week, in his opening address to the General Assembly, the future Nobel
laureate’s moral plea reached all member states in six official UN languages,9 and the
same theme was put forward more delicately a year later at the Millennium Summit.10
The reactions in the General Assembly hall were raucous and predictable, from
China, Russia, and, especially, much of the Third World. Unilateral intervention—that
is, without Security Council authorization, however many countries are involved in a
coalition—for whatever reasons, including genuine humanitarian ones, remains taboo.
As Gareth Evans tells us, ‘‘sovereignty thus hard won, and proudly enjoyed, is
sovereignty not easily relinquished or compromised.’’11
Annan’s reframing helped shift the balance away from the absolute rights of state
leaders to respect for the popular will and internal forms of governance based on
international standards.12 Advocates suggest that the sovereignty of a state does not
stand higher than the human rights of its inhabitants. That this argument came from
the world’s top international civil servant resonated loudly.

The Responsibility to Protect
The ICISS mandate was to build on this emerging understanding of the problem of
intervention and state sovereignty and to find political consensus on military
intervention to support humanitarian objectives. The immediate stimuli were the
divergent reactions—or rather, non-reactions—by the Security Council to Rwanda and
Kosovo. In 1994 intervention was too little and too late to halt, or even slow, the
murder of what may have been as many as 800,000 people in the Great Lakes region of
Africa. In 1999 the formidable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finessed
the council and waged war, for the first time in its fifty years of existence, in Kosovo.
But many observers saw the seventy-eight-day bombing effort as too much and too
early, perhaps creating as much suffering as it relieved. In both cases, the Security
Council failed to act expeditiously to protect vulnerable populations.
The ICISS laid down two normative markers. First, it aimed to alter the consensus
on the use of deadly force to help victims in harm’s way. Second, it emphasized that the
international responsibility to intervene to halt mass killings and ethnic cleansing is
located with the Security Council, and that any intervention should be efficient and
effective.
9
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The ‘‘basic principles’’ merit attention:
A
B

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the
protection of its people lies with the state itself.
Where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression, or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.13

The recognized need to reinforce state capacity is not a misplaced nostalgia for
repressive regimes but, rather, an apt recognition, even among committed advocates of
human rights and robust intervention, that state authority is fundamental to enduring
peace and reconciliation. Human rights can be defended over the longer term only by
democratic states with the authority and the monopoly of force to sustain such norms.
The responsibility to protect embraces a temporal continuum—before, during,
and after assaults on civilians. Clearly, preventing the outbreak of mass
violence would be preferable to intervening to stop it, and commitments to postconflict peace building also are imperative if the long-term benefits of intervention are
to be realized.
The challenges before and after the outbreak of lethal conflicts are indisputable,
but more urgent still is non-consensual intervention to protect populations under
deliberate attack. Whether or not states will act to prevent armed conflict or be in a
position to commit themselves to longer-run investments, should we throw up our
hands and forget taking feasible steps to stop mass murder?
For bullish humanitarians, any loss of life is appalling. For the ICISS, which
accurately reflects the existing international political consensus on the subject, a
higher threshold of human suffering must be crossed: acts of such a magnitude that
they shock the conscience and elicit a fundamental humanitarian impulse.
Intervention consists of three categories of threat or actual use of coercion: military
force, economic sanctions and arms embargoes, and international criminal prosecution. While ‘‘military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and
extraordinary measure,’’ the ICISS report specifies what warrants such.14 The ‘‘just
cause threshold’’ is reached if the following conscience-shocking harms occur:
A

B

large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is
the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a
failed state situation; or
large scale ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.15

This double-barreled justification does not go as far as many would have hoped.
However, the insertion of ‘‘actual or apprehended’’ to qualify both agreed thresholds
opens the door fairly wide to acting in advance of massive loss of life or forced
displacement. Justifiable causes could include the overthrow of a democracy or
violations of human rights. The requirement to endure high levels of loss of life before
any action would have undermined the logic of saving lives.
St. Thomas Aquinas or the contemporary moral voices of Michael Walzer and
Bryan Hehir16 would undoubtedly be pleased by the ‘‘precautionary principles’’ behind
the responsibility to protect. The debate in the 1990s can be seen as moving
beyond whether to intervene to how.17 The ICISS’s modified just-war doctrine includes
four elements: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable
prospects.
10
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Since the Security Council’s lack of reaction to Rwanda and inability to act
in Kosovo were the commission’s main driving force, the question of ‘‘right authority’’
was critical. The ICISS report emphasizes that ‘‘there is no better or more appropriate
body than the United Nations Security Council to authorise military intervention for
human protection purposes.’’18 At the same time, the commission left open the
possibility—indeed, the necessity—that ‘‘if it fails to discharge its responsibility to
protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may
not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation and that the
stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.’’19 This possibility
reflects the bottom line of the Kosovo Commission: ‘‘the NATO military intervention
was illegal but legitimate.’’20
The elegant vacillation revolves around the question, What if? Of course, the
reputation of the United Nations will suffer; and states will and should not rule out
other means to react. The intrinsic reality remains the same as it has been throughout
the Westphalian era: if there is a political will and an operational capacity,
humanitarian or other interventions will happen.21
The ICISS process has had two results. First, it reformulates the conceptual basis
for humanitarian intervention. It calls for moving away from the rights of interveners
toward the rights of victims and the responsibilities of outsiders to act. It is primarily
state authorities whose citizens are threatened who have the responsibility to protect.
Yet a residual obligation rests with the larger community of states when an aberrant
member of their club misbehaves egregiously, or implodes. The status of state
sovereignty is not challenged, per se, but reinforced. However, if a state is unwilling or
unable to exercise its protective responsibilities for the rights of its own citizens, it
forfeits the moral claim to be treated as legitimate. Its sovereignty, as well as its right
to non-intervention, is suspended; and the residual responsibility necessitates vigorous
action by outsiders to protect populations at risk. Essentially, governments not
intervening in the face of massive loss of life and displacement should be embarrassed.
Second, the ICISS proposes a new international default setting—a modified justwar doctrine for future interventions to sustain humanitarian values or human rights.
The Security Council was largely missing in action during the Cold War. In the 1970s
and 1980s, ‘‘the Security Council gave humanitarian aspects of armed conflict limited
priority . . . but the early nineteen-nineties can be seen as a watershed.’’22 During the
first half of the decade, twice as many resolutions were passed as during the first fortyfive years of UN history. These resolutions contain repeated references, in the context
of chapter 7, to humanitarian crises amounting to threats to international peace and
security and repeated demands for parties to respect the principles of international
humanitarian law.
Optimists view the ICISS’s The Responsibility to Protect as the most comprehensive attempt to date to tackle the question of sovereignty versus intervention, and even
bitter opponents such as Mohammed Ayoob admit its ‘‘considerable moral force.’’23 The
endorsement of more than 150 presidents, prime ministers, and princes at the 2005
World Summit demonstrates normative consensus. Indeed, R2P was one of the few
substantive items to emerge relatively intact from the negotiations at the summit.24
The final outcome document contained an unambiguous acceptance of individual state
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity.
However, the summit’s language could also be seen as a step backward, or ‘‘R2P
lite,’’ for two reasons.25 First, humanitarian intervention has to be approved by the
11
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Security Council, and the document makes no mention of ‘‘what if?’’ Second, the
overemphasis on state responsibility and the absence of an ‘‘international’’ responsibility to protect permits continued foot-dragging in places like Darfur. In addition, the
World Summit also kicked the issue of criteria back to the General Assembly, where a
discussion is bound to stall.
However, the overall treatment of R2P suggests that consensus building can
sometimes take place around even the most controversial issues and with opposition
from the strangest of bedfellows—in this case, the United States and the Non-Aligned
Movement. The summit’s final text reaffirms the primary roles of states in protecting
their own citizens and encourages international assistance to weak states to exercise
this responsibility. At the same time, it also makes clear the requirement for
international intervention when countries fail to shield their citizens from (or, more
likely, actively sponsor) genocide.

Military Humanitarianism: On-the-Ground Realities
Normative developments are promising, but on-the-ground humanitarian intervention, or, rather, the lack thereof, is cause for cynicism. Overzealous military action for
insufficient humanitarian reasons—long the battle cry in the global South—certainly
is no danger. Rather, the real threat to international society comes from doing nothing
while condoning massive suffering in the DRC, overlooking slaughter in northern
Uganda, and observing Sudan’s slow-motion genocide.
Indeed, the conflict in the DRC, often described as ‘‘Africa’s First World War,’’ is
the deadliest on the planet since World War II. The simultaneous domestic and
international conflict—directly involving nine African countries and some twenty
armed groups—is fueled by the looting of rich deposits of copper, zinc, and diamonds as
well as by ethnic violence and tribal warfare.26 Since 1998, an estimated 4 million
people have died, largely from the famine and disease accompanying armed conflict.
The United Nations’ foray into the war-torn country began in 1999, after a tenuous
brokered peace agreement. Although considerably expanded from its original
deployment, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, authorized
under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, consists of a mere 15,900 troops, well below the
secretary-general’s suggested troop level of 23,900 to secure peace and security in a
country the size of Western Europe.27 The relative success, for the moment, of two sets
of elections in 2006 does not contradict the total absence of political will to address the
world’s most ‘‘forgotten emergency,’’28 the numerical equivalent of five Rwandas.
If the DRC is forgotten, the situation in northern Uganda amounts to a ‘‘secret
genocide,’’ according to Olara Otunnu, the former UN under-secretary-general and
special representative for children and armed conflict.29 Although Uganda’s President
Yoweri Museveni is generally hailed in the media and by international financial
institutions as a new model for Africa, the decade-long effort to subjugate some
2 million people (from the Acholi, Lango, and Teso regions) in 200 refugee camps is a
hidden side of Museveni’s ‘‘success.’’ Ninety-five percent of the Acholi live in these
camps, where as many as 1,500 children die each week and the rate of HIV infection
may be 50%. ‘‘The genocide in northern Uganda is a burning test for the United
Nations’ declaration on the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’’’ writes Otunnu. ‘‘Urgent action
is essential to save them—and redeem the international community’s promise.’’30
Meanwhile, in Sudan, a kind of international ‘‘activism’’ is present. Firm numbers
are hard to come by concerning the catastrophe in Darfur; at least 200,000 but as many
as 400,000 black Africans may have died, countless women left behind have been
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Halting Genocide: Rhetoric versus Reality

raped, and as many as 3 million people have been forcibly displaced. The collective
spinelessness since early 2003 in the face of Darfur’s disaster could be even more
destructive of the fabric of international law than the 800,000 deaths in Rwanda.
At least, in 1994, the Clinton administration attempted to maintain the fiction
that no such horror was under way as would have implied the necessity to act.31
But no longer can we put that genie back in the bottle. If we recognize genocide
and do nothing, the 1948 UNCG literally is not worth the paper on which it is
reproduced.
This time the facts are not disputed. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof
has conscientiously called attention to the tragedy but cryptically lamented that ‘‘the
publishing industry manages to respond more quickly to genocide than the UN and
world leaders do.’’32 The US Congress condemned Darfur unanimously, voting 422–0
in July 2004 that Khartoum was committing ‘‘genocide,’’33 and Secretary of State Colin
Powell used the dreaded term in a speech in September of that year,34 which coincided
with views from such private groups as Physicians for Human Rights.35 In the same
month, European Union parliamentarians urged Sudan to end actions that could be
‘‘construed as tantamount to genocide.’’36
Rather than military action to halt the killing and displacement, the reinforced
Third World apprehension about any Western pressure in the hapless Sudan led to the
deployment of 7,000 largely ineffective African Union (AU) soldiers and an
investigation by the International Criminal Court.37 In February 2006, the Security
Council decided to absorb the AU troops into a UN force that could number between
12,000 and 20,000 when and if it were deployed. Three years after the killing and
displacement began, it remained unclear which countries (other than the United
States, which categorically said ‘‘no’’) would put boots on the ground. In April 2006,
when the council managed only to agree on targeted sanctions against four
individuals, the chasm between the magnitude of the suffering and the international
response could hardly have been greater.
The charade continued throughout the summer and fall as states slavishly courted
the central government to seek its permission before sending more troops. Khartoum,
responsible for the tragedy in the first place, expelled the outspoken special
representative Jan Pronk in October 2006. The UN’s point man for humanitarian
affairs, Jan Egeland, asserted that ‘‘we are playing with a powder keg.’’38 In addition to
the mass killing and displacement, continued insecurity left some one million people
beyond the reach of aid workers, rendering them vulnerable to starvation and disease.
Even if, eventually, the feeble AU force is reinforced with UN-mandated soldiers and
the problems of such a mixed force are overcome, the result will have been another
ugly scar on the international record.
Khartoum cleverly linked even feeble Western activism in Darfur to US and
British action in Iraq. As David Rieff writes, ‘‘in Europe or the U.S., sending NATO
forces to Darfur may seem like fulfilling the global moral responsibility to protect. But
in much of the Muslim world, it is far likelier to be experienced as one more incursion
of a Christian army into an Islamic land.’’39
Specific military challenges in giving operational meaning to R2P are distinct from
the more familiar ones of either peacekeeping or fighting a war, the end points on a
spectrum of international military action. The ICISS research volume sought
especially to highlight specific challenges in between—namely, how protection can
be afforded to populations at risk, and how those who prey upon them can be
deterred.40
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To date, the cumulative scorecard is discouraging for meeting the challenges of
coercive protection, which potentially is politically and militarily less onerous than
compelling compliance. A recent Stimson Center report demonstrates that precious
little has changed in the half-decade since the publication of the ICISS volumes.
Western militaries have not moved to develop the key concepts—for example, what it
would take to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur and Chad, or to disarm a refugee
camp, or to protect a safe area. The absence of political will by major powers is clearly
an obstacle to military deployments to protect war victims, but so too is the lack of
evolution in military doctrine. Some even question whether the protection of civilians
is an impossible mandate. Deployed forces often lack the operational guidance and
military preparation to effectively intervene to halt genocide and shield civilians from
heinous abuses. Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman argue that ‘‘the time has come to
translate the ‘responsibility to protect’ into terms that militaries can understand and
implement—such as concepts of operation, doctrine, training, rules of engagement,
and mandates—to move lofty ideals into concrete actions on the ground.’’41

Civilian Humanitarianism:
Operating Procedures

Contesting

Standard

Principles

and

The treacherous and unfamiliar terrain of Mary Kaldor’s ‘‘new wars’’—internal armed
conflicts waged primarily by non-state actors who subsist on illicit and parasitic
economic behavior, use small arms and other low-technology hardware, and prey upon
civilians, including aid workers and journalists—has created substantial challenges
for civilian humanitarians. While debate rages about how ‘‘new’’ many elements
of contemporary wars are—that is, many of the same elements have been present in
the past—the intensity and magnitude at least constitute the equivalent of dramatically new contexts that call into question humanitarian strategies and tactics from
earlier wars.
In a famous desiderata, Jean Pictet of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) identified seven core principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality,
independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.42 The first four principles,
though, arguably constitute the core of the ‘‘off-the-rack humanitarian suit.’’43
Humanity commands attention to all people. Impartiality demands that assistance
be based solely on need, without discrimination among recipients because of
nationality, race, religion, or other social characteristics: if necessary, aid agencies
should be prepared to provide assistance to all sides of a conflict. Neutrality, like
impartiality, involves refraining from taking part in hostilities and from any action
that knowingly either benefits or disadvantages the parties to an armed conflict.
Neutrality is both an end and a means because it helps relief agencies gain access to
populations at risk. Independence demands that aid not be connected to any of the
parties directly involved in the conflict or having a stake in the outcome, including
donors who fund particular activities.
If war-related international humanitarianism had an inaugural moment, it was
the ICRC’s 1864 establishment and the emergence of international humanitarian
law.44 In response to the circumstances of fallen and injured soldiers, humanitarian
activists pursued an immediate goal—to convince states to give them access to these
populations at risk. The popularity and resonance of the idea were enormous; within
three years the grassroots campaign produced the ICRC and the Geneva Conventions.
Humanitarianism’s next great leap forward occurred as a consequence of the two
world wars of the twentieth century. In terms of institution building, many of the most
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familiar of today’s non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations emerged in
reaction to the forces of destruction. NGOs, in most cases, were running ahead of states
in the area of refugee relief (and lobbying states to do their share).
World War II proved to be a moment when the very specter of rampant inhumanity
led an ‘‘international community’’ to create a hope for a different future. The
Holocaust, the death camps, the death marches, the fire bombings, and the use of
nuclear weapons led diplomats and activists to call for protecting civilians, the
dispossessed, and human dignity. The very idea of human dignity led to such
normative humanitarian pillars as the 1945 UN Charter, the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the UNCG, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(and, eventually, the 1977 Additional Protocols). More intergovernmental and
non-governmental machinery resulted.
During the Cold War, the Security Council defined ‘‘threats to international peace
and security’’ as disputes between states that might or had become militarized,
conflicts involving the great powers, and general threats to global stability. After the
Cold War—and in reaction to the growing perception that domestic conflict and civil
wars were leaving hundreds of thousands of populations at risk, creating mass
flight, and destabilizing entire regions—the council authorized interventions where
war-induced disasters imperiled regional and international security.
Although academic debate continued about whether the dynamics of such warfare
were new, the significance of ‘‘new wars’’ was obvious on the international agenda and
in the media spotlight.45 A new label, ‘‘complex humanitarian emergencies,’’ depicted
the ugly and confusing reality of a ‘‘conflict-related humanitarian disaster involving a
high degree of breakdown and social dislocation and, reflecting this condition,
requiring a system-wide aid response from the international community.’’46
In a world in which armed conflict was largely of the interstate variety, the ICRC’s
principles made sense—indeed, they constituted a ‘‘gold standard.’’ Belligerents were
states confined by international law, which placed limits on how they waged war. The
Geneva Conventions outlawed attacks on civilians and guaranteed access to those
seeking to help injured soldiers and populations at risk. State adherence to constraints
on war was motivated not by altruism but, rather, by the reciprocal interests of
warring state parties. Clearly, today’s landscape is different.

Civilian Humanitarianism: New Humanitarian Conundrums
Contemporary warfare is mainly intrastate, with warring parties who operate without
constraints. Violence against civilians has indeed become a staple tactic of warfare. In
Rwanda some 800,000 people (one-tenth of the population) were slaughtered in a
period of a few weeks, while as many as 250,000 to 500,000 women were raped and half
the population forcibly displaced; and in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were some 250,000
deaths, with between 20,000 and 50,000 rapes, and 2.7 million people in need of
assistance. Such disasters pose significant quantitative and qualitative challenges for
those seeking to come to the rescue.
The plethora of civil wars in the 1990s, usually characterized by large-scale killing
and displacement, challenged the traditional operating principles of humanitarians.
Anxiety and doubt arose as belligerents failed to respect international humanitarian
law, attacked aid personnel, blocked relief convoys, manipulated food aid, and ‘‘taxed’’
humanitarians. In Liberia, for instance, warlord Charles Taylor demanded 15% of aid
entering territory that he controlled. Estimates of the percentage of aid looted,
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diverted, and extorted in Somalia reach as high as 80%, while at least half of all food
aid in the former Yugoslavia was used to feed and supply combatants.47
Aid diversion empowers those responsible for the bloodshed, while feeding
killers in militarized camps not only threatens civilians but also enables violence.
Paying a ‘‘tax’’ to those who control access allows humanitarians to assist victims but
simultaneously funds continued violence by belligerents. Moreover, by working with
spoilers—those not interested in peace—humanitarian organizations may grant
legitimacy to otherwise illegitimate actors. Formal relations with spoilers implicitly
acknowledge the latter’s authority, and a relief role bolsters spoilers’ claims of
legitimacy.
In this context, humanitarians confront formidable dilemmas because their
traditional operating principles frequently lead to unwanted outcomes. Observers
have pointed to a major break in the late 1980s and early 1990s and describe the
experiments on the increasingly complex terrain as ‘‘new humanitarianism’’ and
‘‘political humanitarianism.’’48
Unintended negative consequences meant that reciting the humanitarian mantra
was of no avail. The principles worked well as guidelines when combatants were from
state militaries and usually respected the laws of war and humanitarian space. In the
wake of the Rwandan genocide, however, even the best intentioned of efforts produced
unanticipated and pernicious results. What economists call ‘‘negative externalities’’—
especially striking was strengthening the position of the ge´nocidaires who controlled
the camps in Zaı̈re—were not the result of minor design flaws or a modest lack of
professionalism.
Humanitarian principles are supposed to be insulated from politics, but there has
been a growing recognition that humanitarian activities have political consequences
and inextricably are part of politics. However, what was once implicitly political is now
explicitly so, and what was once taken for granted is now problematized. Furthermore,
agencies actually find these principles dysfunctional in some war-torn areas. In
particular, access to populations in zones of violence often requires working alongside
and associating their activities with those of militaries. As humanitarians have
attempted to promote human rights, they have found that neutrality can be an
obstacle. Can one be neutral toward war criminals? Humanitarian organizations,
which once treated ‘‘politics’’ as a dirty word, have become more willing to engage with
politics.
Alongside the formidable problems of war-torn societies, states were weakening or
collapsing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and outside agencies became the main
lifeline for many distressed populations. Once a state ceases to maintain political
authority or to have a monopoly on violence, borders lose meaning as the locus of war.
The legality as well as the actuality of access are in doubt and may have little or
nothing to do with the authorities that occupy central government offices in the
national capital, the usual interlocutors.
The focus of the new wars on people or resources more than on territory or formal
boundaries creates distinct challenges for humanitarians responding to conflicts that
cross borders while being based essentially on the consent of territorially defined
belligerents. Finding victims, securing access to them, and delivering relief has led to
the creation of humanitarian space in law and practice—that is, room to maneuver
and help in providing protection and relief to war-ravaged populations. But
humanitarian space was guaranteed by states (including belligerents), for interstate
conflicts, by the Geneva Conventions.49 In most new wars, victims do not have
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this luxury. Belligerents often do not provide consent, allow for the passage of relief, or
respect international agreements—they are often unaware of them and are not
signatories.
Civilian humanitarians themselves have become targets of violence, as evident
from the growing number of fatalities among aid workers in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A review of aid workers killed in recent years attests to a disconcerting upswing: from
1992 to 2001, 204 UN civilian personnel were killed and more than 250 assaulted or
robbed.50 Thirty-one aid workers were killed in Afghanistan over the course of 2005,
up from twenty-four the previous year.51 While the degree to which aid workers are
increasingly in harm’s way must be placed in the context of their mushrooming
numbers,52 attacks causing multiple deaths, such as those on UN and ICRC
headquarters in Baghdad in late 2003 or on multiple members of such private
groups as MSF in Afghanistan in 2004 and Action Contre la Faim in Sri Lanka in 2006,
suggest that attacking aid workers has a high theatrical demonstration value.53
Thus, the dangers of the new wars have not simply considerably circumscribed
access to war-affected populations; the humanitarian mantle no longer affords
meaningful physical protection for aid workers.

Contemporary Impediments to Human Protection
In looking back over the last two decades, and especially in thinking about the next, we
find that the essential challenges of humanitarian intervention to halt genocide are
not normative but operational. What political realities stand in the way of making R2P
a reality—of turning ‘‘here we go again’’ into a genuine ‘‘never again,’’ the fervent
battle cry that resulted from the Holocaust of World War II? While constraints are
certainly not in short supply, five crucial ones are discussed here.54

A Trojan Horse
Students of history who recall the so-called humanitarian interventions of the
nineteenth century will understand why the contemporary version encounters a
substantial residue of visceral anti-colonialism in the Third World. Commercial and
geopolitical calculations were cloaked in the language of humanitarian and religious
motives, with an overlay of paternalism. As a result, the doctrine was discredited
among countries gaining independence from colonial rule, and something akin to this
condemnation also can be seen as applying to the responsibility to protect.
Conditional sovereignty uncomfortably resurrects ‘‘standards of civilization’’ and
‘‘the white man’s burden.’’55 Powerful states can determine whose human rights justify
departing from the principle of non-intervention. Most importantly, the responsibility
to protect can seem a euphemism for US hegemony, the proverbial Trojan horse for
imperial designs. Kofi Annan’s plea that human rights transcend sovereignty met an
outright rejection from many UN member states: ‘‘The use of force as a sanction for a
breach of an international obligation may do more harm than the breach of the
international obligation; the cure is often worse than the disease.’’56
Readers should recall Kosovo, which highlighted the need for guidelines when nonintervention is morally repugnant but the Security Council is paralyzed.57 What
nature and gravity of threats justify external military intervention? The ICISS
proffered its response, but controversy continues over conflicting principles that
produce normative incoherence, inconsistency, and contestation.58
Developing countries, at least in their collective public diplomacy, reaffirm the
narrowest interpretation of traditional sovereignty. Algerian President Abdelaziz
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Bouteflika’s remarks, after Annan’s justification at the General Assembly in 1999,
capture that position: ‘‘we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our
sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defence against the rules of an
unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-making process of
the Security Council.’’59
The Non-Aligned Movement—with 113 members, arguably the most representative group of countries outside the UN itself—publicly rejects ‘‘the right of
humanitarian intervention,’’ even if Africans on their own usually are seeking more
outside intervention to halt humanitarian disasters.60 Developing countries are not
alone in their recalcitrance. For example, American ‘‘sovereigntists’’ have launched
their own counterattack.61
David Rieff wonders whether the revolution of moral concern ‘‘has actually kept a
single jackboot out of a single human face.’’62 My own somber lament is that there still
is appallingly sparse responsibility to protect those suffering from atrocities that shock
the human conscience—‘‘unhumanitarian non-intervention.’’ The reticence, and in
some cases hostility, of many developing countries toward humanitarian intervention
is unlikely to disappear as long as inconsistency and disingenuousness characterize
Western responses to humanitarian catastrophes.

9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism
Conventional wisdom now holds that terrorism and the attacks on US territory of
September 2001 brought a paradigm change in international relations. It has become
equally commonplace to hear that the United Nations is at a crossroads. Speaking
before the General Assembly in September 2003, the secretary-general stated that the
world organization was at a ‘‘fork in the road . . . no less decisive than 1945 itself, when
the United Nations was founded.’’63
The United Nations’ credibility and legitimacy were the subjects of considerable
debate well before 9/11.64 Selectivity and double standards in Security Council
decisions about which conflicts warranted a response, for example, contributed to a
sense that this UN organ was simply a conduit for Western security interests. Why
persist in Bosnia and withdraw from Rwanda? Why commit so fully to Kosovo and not
to Sudan or the DRC? Few would make the ideal the enemy of the good—that is, by
insisting that humanitarian intervention must occur whenever and wherever a crisis
exists or not at all. Nonetheless, too much and too blatant inconsistency tarnishes the
UN’s reputation as an honest broker.
Trumpeting self-defense as a response to 9/11 was understandable and even
approved by the Security Council. However, the blanket authorization for Afghanistan
can now be seen as a prelude to the Bush administration’s determination to take on
Iraq, with or without Security Council approval. In March 2003, the United Nations
was sidelined in the war against Iraq. Everyone was unhappy—the UN could not
impede US hegemony, nor could it approve the requisite action against Saddam
Hussein.
Consensus building around R2P must be seen in this context. Many countries, in
Europe and in the Third World, are unwilling to accept any use of military force that is
not approved by the Security Council—not even for humanitarian or human-rights
purposes, let alone for pre-emptive or preventive war. The authority of the
international political process, however flawed, is at least regulated internationally.
Setting aside agreed procedures, as NATO did in Kosovo and especially as Washington
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and London did in Iraq, threatens to destroy a tenuous but nonetheless essential rule
governing international society.65
The wars in Iraq and on terror have had three stifling effects on necessary
normative conversations about criteria in the General Assembly.66 First, the selective
use of the Security Council has been compounded by the US/British decision to go to
war against Iraq without Security Council approval after having so assiduously sought
it. Indeed, this is a conversation stopper for many when considering setting aside the
principle of non-intervention.
Second, the legitimate idea of humanitarian intervention has been contaminated
by association with George W. Bush’s and Tony Blair’s spurious and largely ex post
facto ‘‘humanitarian’’ justifications for invading Iraq. In a widely cited speech to his
Sedgefield constituency in March 2004, Blair provided the clearest example of the
potential for abusing R2P when applying it retroactively: ‘‘But we surely have a duty
and a right to prevent the threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to
act when a nation’s people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s.’’67
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America continues to
circumscribe discussions about using force.68 The Bush doctrine ‘‘has had the effect of
reinforcing fears both of US dominance and of the chaos that could ensue if what is
sauce for the US goose were to become sauce for many other would-be interventionist
ganders,’’ according to Adam Roberts.69 How can one gainsay those who are reluctant
to codify norms about using military force for human protection purposes? The Bush
and Blair doctrine seems to require renewing the principle of non-intervention rather
than any downgrading of sovereign prerogatives, even for a humanitarian rationale.
Third, the possibility of moving the General Assembly toward debating criteria has
stalled. Ramesh Thakur argues that R2P criteria would make it more difficult for
states to claim the humanitarian label for purely self-interested interventions.70 His
logic is impeccable but irrelevant; this discussion has been postponed sine die in the
General Assembly. The atmosphere has simply become too poisonous. Richard Falk
explains why: ‘‘After September 11, the American approach to humanitarian
intervention morphed into post hoc rationalizations for uses of force otherwise difficult
to reconcile with international law.’’71
If R2P’s ‘‘just cause threshold’’ could have justified humanitarian intervention in
1999 in Kosovo, would not the same logic apply to Saddam Hussein’s regime, whose
history was certainly as ugly as Slobodan Milosevic’s? The just cause threshold could
arguably have been invoked for Iraq, but it was not invoked before the resort to force
and certainly was a minor factor in the decision to attack. Indeed, the just cause
threshold might well have been invoked in March 1988—when Saddam used chemical
weapons against the Kurdish city of Halabja in northern Iraq, instantly killing 5,000
civilians—or on numerous other occasions in the 1990s. But they were not. And in the
run-up to the March 2003 war, only the most perfunctory of references were made.
Thus, the use of ‘‘humanitarian’’ has the hollow ring of rationalization after the fact
and after the earlier justifications—mainly WMDs and links to Al Qaeda—proved
vacuous.
It is more doubtful still that the other criteria could have been satisfied: right
intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects, and right authority.
Moreover, the primary purpose of the war in Iraq was the pursuit of geopolitical
interests; halting human suffering was at most an afterthought. There remains a
question about whether reasonable non-military options had been exhausted and the
means were proportional. Determining whether the consequences of the war are worse
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than inaction will require waiting to see how long the post-war misery lasts and the
future shape of Iraq.
But, most important, even if the five previous criteria had been met, which clearly
they were not, the ICISS emphasizes just authority, which preferably means an
overwhelming show of support from the Security Council or at least from a regional
organization. Dissent within the council about the war in Iraq, and indeed across
the planet, was far more visible than in the case of Kosovo. In withdrawing the
resolution to authorize military force in March 2003, Washington and London were not
even assured a simple majority and were also confronting three vetoes. Moreover,
there was not unanimous approval for the Iraq campaign from a nineteen-member
regional body, as in Kosovo—in fact, both NATO and the European Union were split.
And regional organizations were categorically against the war. Widespread international backing, let alone right authority, was conspicuously absent.
Military intervention for human protection purposes using The Responsibility to
Protect is one thing; military intervention for preventive war is quite another. The
world requires capabilities to come to the rescue of vulnerable peoples, not fuzzy
applications of legitimate concepts to obfuscate more sinister motivations.
Countries that earlier would have supported the R2P concept subsequently became
reluctant or hostile toward unilateral humanitarian intervention (that is, outside of
Security Council decision making). As a result, ‘‘the Iraq war has undermined the
standing of the United States and the U.K. as norm carriers . . . [and] the process of
normative change is likely to be slowed or reversed.’’72 Widespread apprehensions
regarding US military activism were rekindled by the Iraq crisis and confirmed by
Blair’s and Bush’s attempts to twist the concept of the responsibility to protect.
In spite of incantations from Kofi Annan and his high-level panel, humanitarian
intervention is a harder sell these days than a few years ago, thanks to fears about the
use of any imprimatur. Humanitarian intervention is no longer on the side of the
angels, for fear that the Bush administration could manipulate it and strengthen its
rationale for pre-emptive attacks against rogue states and terrorists.

The Distracted Superpower
Terrorism, and UN responses to it, reveal and accentuate the implications of the post–
Cold War international system based on US preponderance—military, economic, and
cultural. While the members of the ICISS met in 2001 with French foreign minister
Hubert Védrine, they failed to appreciate his apt depiction of hyper-puissance. On the
one hand, major power politics have always dominated the UN. On the other hand,
there is no modern precedent for the current dimensions of the US Goliath.
UN diplomats almost unanimously described the debate surrounding the resolution
withdrawn on the eve of the war in Iraq as ‘‘a referendum not on the means of
disarming Iraq but on the American use of power.’’73
What exactly is the meaning of a collective security organization in a world so
dominated by a sole superpower? Washington is, at best, indifferent to the United
Nations and, at worst, has a penchant to weaken or destroy it. Much of contemporary
UN debate could be compared with the Roman Senate’s efforts to control the emperor.
Washington’s multilateral record in the twentieth century conveys ‘‘mixed
messages,’’ as Edward Luck reminds us. The United States has sometimes been the
prime mover for international institutions and norms, but just as often it has kept its
distance or stood in the way.74 In the past, Washington was careful and somewhat
reluctant to thumb its nose openly. The argument was that American ‘‘exceptionalism’’
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was, well, exceptional—that is, to be saved for an unusual set of events when
international cooperation was simply out of the question.
The hard currency in the international system remains military might. Before the
war on Iraq, the ‘‘hyper-power’’ was already spending more on its military than the
next fifteen to twenty-five countries (depending on who was counting). With additional
appropriations for Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington began spending more than
the rest of the world’s militaries combined.75 And even in the domain of soft power, the
United States remains without challenge on the world stage for the foreseeable future,
although some analysts see hegemony as more Western than American.76
Even so, downsizing of the armed forces over the last fifteen years means
an insufficient supply of equipment and manpower to meet the demands for
humanitarian intervention. There are bottlenecks in the US logistics chain—especially
in airlift capacity—that make improbable a rapid international response to a
fast-moving, Rwanda-like genocide. With half of the US Army tied down in Iraq
and a quarter of its reserves overseas, questions are being raised about the capacity to
adequately respond to a serious national security threat or a natural disaster like
Hurricane Katrina, let alone ‘‘distractions’’ like Liberia or Haiti.
The prediction that major powers other than the United States would not respond
with military force to a new humanitarian emergency after September 11 proved
somewhat too pessimistic, as Europe’s takeover from NATO of the Bosnia operation in
December 2004 and other examples suggest. However, there is little doubt that
US airlift capacity, military muscle, and technology are required for larger and longerterm deployments. For better or worse, the United States in the Security Council
is what former US secretary of state Dean Rusk once called the fat boy in the canoe:
‘‘When we roll, everyone rolls with us.’’77
The present is an unparalleled multilateral moment, with implications for
humanitarian intervention to stop genocide as for other international decisions.
There are two ‘‘world organizations.’’ The United Nations is global in membership, but
the United States is global in reach and power. UN-led or UN-approved operations
with substantial military requirements take place only when Washington approves
or at least acquiesces. The reality of US power means that if the United Nations
and multilateral cooperation are to have a chance of working, let alone flourishing,
the globe’s remaining superpower must be on board. This undoubtedly will have to
await the 2008 presidential election.

War Economies, Spoilers, and Privatization
Another crucial drag on the current international system’s capacity to engage in
humanitarian intervention is the nature of local war economies accompanied by
spoilers and privatization.78 So called because they seek to prevent others from turning
a page on armed conflict and thus to foster war, ‘‘spoilers’’79 are perhaps better
described as ‘‘war entrepreneurs’’; these have been present in previous armed conflicts,
but the current generation is more numerous and better equipped to wreak havoc. The
synergy of local and global economic conditions, coupled with relatively inexpensive
arms, allows nonstate actors to assemble military capacity without much difficulty or
investment.
Laurent Kabila is reported to have quipped that all that was required to have an
‘‘army’’ in Zaı̈re was $10,000 and a cell phone. Aid agencies and foreign militaries face
a steep learning curve in negotiating or militarily securing access in such contexts.
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Reflection is more valuable than visceral reactions. Humanitarian impulses and
goodwill simply are no longer adequate, if indeed they ever were.80
Two general types of economies circumscribe many contemporary wars and
humanitarian action. First are ‘‘war economies,’’ or those interests that directly profit
from armed conflict. The new wars do not operate with the sophistication or technology
of the US military-industrial complex, but a network of economically calculating actors
profits from the production of violence. The second type is that of ‘‘aid economies,’’
or interests that benefit from the provision of external assistance.
International efforts to thwart war economies follow two tracks: controlling means
and controlling ends. The former seeks to prevent or limit economically based actors
from developing their ability to wage war. Examples are international efforts to
restrict the spread of small arms and regulations to ban mercenaries.81 The second
track seeks to regulate the resources over which new wars are waged. The UN has
emphasized the role of plundered natural resources, particularly in Africa.82 Natural
resources used to be considered a blessing. But this truism has been called into
question because a variety of resources—gold, silver, coltran, timber, copper, titanium,
and diamonds—can be looted to sustain contemporary wars.
Powerful external commercial interests that are vital to national economic
development—such as oil, mining, and timber companies—can sometimes constitute
additional obstacles to relief efforts or even spark conflicts that trigger humanitarian
crises. Foreign oil companies in Africa alone—the ‘‘scorched earth’’ of southern Sudan,
the charged ethnic environment of the delta in Nigeria, or the deposits that have
funded guerrillas and governments in Angola—demonstrate their significance.
The focus of predators in aid economies is not so much on benefiting from violence
as on profiting from the generosity to relieve suffering. Aid can facilitate speculation,
hoarding, and exploitation by greedy middlemen, and can generate conditions
conducive to breeding future resentments and exacerbating local tensions.
Furthermore, outside aid can also be a disincentive to indigenous capacity building.
Among humanitarians, the response to the new landscape has been a modified
Hippocratic Oath—long a theme in the work of Mary Anderson—and the adoption of
‘‘do no harm’’ criteria.83 The idea is to carry out emergency efforts to improve the
ability of communities and public authorities to take control of their own destinies,
begin development, and react better to future disasters.
Although an in-depth analysis suggests that the economic impact of peacekeeping
has been largely positive, aid operations ‘‘are regularly criticized for a wide array of
damage they are thought to do to the war-torn economies into which they deploy.’’84
The economies of war and of aid suggest the uncertain terrain on which aid workers
tread while trying to help, and the complications are often especially acute after a
military intervention. These elements were not unknown in earlier armed conflicts,
but the magnitude of outside aid and a globalizing world economy create an unusual
witch’s brew in contemporary wars.

A Humanitarian Identity Crisis
For the last two decades, humanitarian agencies have careered from one emergency to
another, confronting nearly unimaginable challenges. Some of these spectacles made
front-page news and profiled heroic and not-so-heroic activities. In Bosnia, they
attempted to provide relief to those trapped in so-called safe havens—zones,
resembling prisons, that were supposed to protect inhabitants from Serbian attacks
but in fact were among the most unsafe places on the planet. In Rwanda,
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humanitarians were largely absent during the genocide itself but began attempting to
save millions of displaced peoples in camps militarized and controlled by the architects
of the mass murder. In Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, aid-agency personnel were
funded by and operated alongside invading and occupying soldiers, which meant that
civilian helpers found themselves being treated as enemy combatants by insurgents.
To add to their woes, aid agencies have been criticized as enriching themselves from
the needs of local populations on the dole, requiring wars as part of a new international
political economy.85
Twenty years of daunting challenges have compelled the members of the
international humanitarian system to re-examine who they are, what they do, and
how they do it. Questions that were once essentially answered, or were asked
rhetorically with ready-made replies, are now open for honest debate. The most
gut-wrenching recognition that well-intentioned humanitarian action can lead to
negative consequences has forced humanitarian organizations to measure their
effectiveness. Such exercises require contemplating not only the values that motivate
actions but also the consequences of those actions.
The humanitarian enterprise is in considerable flux—if the industry were not
a century and a half old, we might describe the present situation as a ‘‘mid-life crisis.’’
The expiry date has passed for the international humanitarian system; what is driving
the debate are differences over the value of military intervention. There is substantial
disagreement about how humanitarian organizations should respond, with some
insisting that they have to adapt and others arguing that adaptations might change
humanitarianism beyond recognition. Indeed, while some suggest that the sector has
improved its ability to deliver relief and protect rights, David Rieff contends that
‘‘humanitarianism [is] in crisis’’ because it has lost its soul by compromising with and
conforming to the new world order.86
A philosophical chasm is widening about the political implications of humanitarian
intervention and action.87 On one side are the ‘‘classicists,’’ who continue to uphold the
principles of neutrality, impartiality, and consent. On the other are ‘‘solidarists’’ who
side with selected victims, publicly confront hostile governments, advocate partisan
public policies in donor states, attempt to skew the distribution of aid resources, and
refuse to respect the sovereignty of states. Moreover, many no longer view
humanitarianism as limited to short-term emergency relief to war victims, because
job descriptions now also include such broader objectives as protecting human rights,
promoting democracy, fostering development, and hastening peace building.88
For many on the latter part of the spectrum, humanitarianism is no longer viewed
as ‘‘pure,’’ and acceptance of neutrality, a cornerstone of humanitarianism, is seen as
naı̈ve. Proponents believe that aid should not be merely palliative and given without
regard to political context. Such a position is starkly apparent in the late Fred Cuny’s
labeling of Bosnian Muslims as ‘‘the well-fed dead,’’ signaling the tragedy of aid
workers’ merely providing food assistance to those who were largely at risk not from
starvation but from murder at the hands of Serbian troops and paramilitary forces.
Rather, it should be ameliorative and address the structural problems that foment
humanitarian crises in the first place. And, when possible, it should be conceived in
such a way as to help cement peace processes.
An even more controversial cleavage appeared between classicists and solidarists
with the advent of the most obviously politicized strain of humanitarianism, the use of
military force to halt genocide. The spread of new wars and massive crises in Africa
and the Balkans spawned a hot topic: whether or not the use of force could legitimately
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be advocated on humanitarian grounds, and, if so, whether its use did war victims
more harm than good.
Since the 1990s, the goalposts have moved on numerous occasions. The explosion
of new wars spurred rethinking about consent, impartiality, and neutrality, as well as
the use of force. Some humanitarians espoused a more muscular stance and pushed for
soldiers as ‘‘humanitarian warriors.’’ At a minimum, most aid agencies took advantage
of military action to secure humanitarian goals, but usually with a somewhat defensive
and begrudging posture—as a last resort and for a limited time. However, as armed aid
convoys and security for refugee camps became routine and insecurity remained, some
humanitarians supported the use of force to militarily defeat those who cause or
worsen crises.
At the other end of the spectrum, classicists still often view military forces as the
antithesis of true humanitarianism, or at least as wishful thinking without the
presence of substantial national interests to stay the course—which are rarely in
evidence. These categories are designed to shed light on the nature of differences and
do not necessarily portray the specific behavior of any agency at all times. What unites
the classicists, however, is their worry about the ‘‘risk of being associated with
a potentially unwelcome military force, and thereby losing the protective patina
of neutrality.’’89
The value of a humanitarian veneer for the military was obvious when Colin
Powell described NGOs in Iraq as a ‘‘force multiplier.’’ He was even clearer later in the
same speech when he noted that they were part of his ‘‘combat team.’’90 As one military
analyst notes, ‘‘In the wake of 9/11 some Western countries, especially the United
States, have stressed the strategic and force-protection benefits of assistance and
reconstruction as part of broader military strategies.’’91
The new wars frame the peculiar collective-action problems of the new
humanitarianisms, but they encounter a very old problem—the fragmentation of the
international humanitarian system. With no central power of the purse and no
wherewithal to ensure compliance, cohesive action in an atomized system is the
exception rather than the rule. It is more necessary than ever with the growing
number of NGOs, but it remains unlikely. Indeed, the word ‘‘system’’ disguises the
fact that overall performance reflects the sum of individual actions rather than
a planned, singular, and coherent whole. The use of another image, the international humanitarian ‘‘family,’’ might be more apt in that it allows for several
eventualities, including the extremely dysfunctional efforts of proprietary UN agencies
and market-share-oriented NGOs.92
At the same time, it would be unfair to imply a total absence of adaptation.
Humanitarian action has begun to evolve into a better-defined field of professional
activity with improved and appropriate career development. Over the last two decades,
what Larry Minear aptly calls the ‘‘humanitarian enterprise’’93 has become
a recognized field with more donors, deliverers, and regulators. Not only have
the numbers grown, but also the field is characterized by regular interactions among
the members; a greater reliance on specialized knowledge; and a collective awareness
of a common undertaking, albeit with some old-timers protesting the fading of
volunteerism and the onset of bureaucratization.94 Nothing could be more obvious
than the need for professionalism among aid workers acting side-by-side with soldiers
during humanitarian interventions.
However, collective-action problems are clearly exacerbated by the lack of agreement concerning the scope and nature of humanitarian activity. Some humanitarians
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pursue a broad range of tasks with military protection. Others, such as the ICRC,
remain more closely committed to traditional principles, preferring not to be tainted
by politicized activity that may endanger not only the fulfillment of goals but the lives
of aid providers. Thus, in addition to the multiplicity of actors on the scene, an
incentive structure that encourages resource grabbing, and donor preferences
that may have geopolitical underpinnings, the humanitarian identity crisis is yet
another centrifugal force pulling actors in multiple directions with respect to military
intervention to halt genocide.

Conclusion
The ICISS was originally established because of the Security Council’s failure to
address dire humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Kosovo. However, the absence of
meaningful military might in Rwanda—like the do-nothing approach in the Darfur
region of Sudan, in Uganda, and in the DRC—represents a more serious threat
to international order and justice than the council’s paralysis in Kosovo.
A 1999 survey of affected populations in several war zones reports that fully
two-thirds of civilians under siege who were interviewed by the ICRC in twelve
war-torn societies wanted more intervention, and only 10% wanted none.95 A 2005
mapping exercise of operational contexts for humanitarian agencies finds that
recipients, rightly, ‘‘are more concerned about what is provided than about who
provides it.’’96
It is soothing for those of us who are preoccupied with normative developments to
point proudly to paragraphs 138–39 as one of the few success stories of the World
Summit. On the one hand, that clearly is true. Cosmopolitanism is compelling
normatively, and R2P is an important step. On the other hand, the summit has not
altered the geopolitical reality that ‘‘never again’’ is an inaccurate description of the
actual impact of the 1948 UNCG—‘‘here we go again’’ is closer to the truth. There are
limits to analysis and advocacy with neither the political will nor the operational
capacity among major powers to act on new norms. Stephen Lewis is blunt: ‘‘Alas, man
and woman cannot live by rhetoric alone.’’97
We live in a new world for which the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty has reiterated the central role of the Security
Council—reformed and enlarged or not—and urged it to act. But if it does not,
humanitarians and victims are left where Kofi Annan was in September 1999 when he
asked the audience in the General Assembly about their reactions had there actually
been a state, or a group of states, willing to act early in April 1994 in Rwanda without a
Security Council imprimatur. ‘‘Should such a coalition have stood aside,’’ he asked
rhetorically, ‘‘and allowed the horror to unfold?’’98
While answers remain equivocal in diplomatic circles, the answer from any of the
800,000 dead Rwandans—or the millions of murdered Sudanese, Ugandans, and
Congolese—would have been a resounding ‘‘No.’’
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Semantics or Substance? David Scheffer’s
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David Scheffer’s fascinating proposal, if I understand it properly, calls for an
amalgamation of various categories of internationally condemned behavior—mainly
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—into a new concept known
as ‘‘atrocity law.’’ This will facilitate implementation of the responsibility to
protect vulnerable populations. Pedantic debates about matters of essentially
technical relevance to criminal prosecution will not be allowed to impede sincere
efforts at intervention or to provide a pretext for those who shirk their obligations.
Leslie Green mooted a similar idea in the mid-1990s, but it didn’t gain any traction
at the time.1 In informal discussions as part of the drafting of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), I argued for Green’s proposal to
conflate crimes against humanity and war crimes but was regularly told that this
simply wasn’t going to fly.
And yet there are many recent developments favoring this drive for greater
coherence and more simplicity. The international tribunals themselves have promoted
the idea of general principles and concepts with respect to war crimes that are drawn
from such formulations as common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In effect,
common article 3 serves as a catchall category that obviates the need for more precise
provisions. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) took two texts drawn from provisions drafted in the 1940s
and ‘‘interpreted’’ them to mean all ‘‘serious violations of international humanitarian
law.’’2 We can see the same kind of consolidation in the tendency of the tribunals to
convict offenders of both crimes against humanity and war crimes. With rare
exceptions, every ‘‘atrocity’’ committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized
as both a war crime and a crime against humanity. Without suggesting that the
distinction is devoid of any significance, in terms of putting evildoers behind bars it has
not proven to be a terribly productive nuance. Much the same can be said of the
distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity. The commission of inquiry
into Darfur concluded against a finding of genocide but said that crimes against
humanity appeared to have been committed and that there was no reason to suggest
that this made the matter any less serious:
The above conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in
Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or though the militias under their
control, should not be taken as in any way detracting from, or belittling, the gravity of
the crimes perpetrated in that region. As stated above genocide is not necessarily the
most serious international crime. Depending upon the circumstances, such international offences as crimes against humanity or large scale war crimes may be no less
William A. Schabas, ‘‘Semantics or Substance? David Scheffer’s Welcome Proposal to Strengthen
Criminal Accountability for Atrocities.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, 1 (April 2007):
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serious and heinous than genocide. This is exactly what happened in Darfur, where
massive atrocities were perpetrated on a very large scale, and have so far gone
unpunished.3

On the political level, there is also a marked tendency toward consolidation of the
categories of international crime. The ‘‘Outcome Document’’ adopted in September
2005 by the United Nations Summit of Heads of State and Government affirmed a
radical new international obligation when it declared that there was a ‘‘responsibility
to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.’’4 In other words, in this most contemporary and authoritative statement of
the parameters of intervention to protect human rights, the member states of the
United Nations have agreed that the responsibility to protect applies to a broad
category of ‘‘atrocity,’’ without distinction.
Is Scheffer proposing that we simply abandon the term ‘‘genocide’’ in favor
of ‘‘atrocity’’ (something that would require a change to the name of this journal!)?
Not quite, it appears, because he also argues for the term ‘‘precursors of genocide,’’
which seems to be a kind of halfway house. The rationale for diluting the requirements
of full-blown genocide into a list of ‘‘precursors’’ is to justify intervention, that is,
implementation of the responsibility to protect. Instead of dawdling about definitional
aspects of genocide, explains Scheffer, we should rapidly reach the less difficult
conclusion that ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ are present and get on with the business
of saving lives and protecting the innocent. But given the far-reaching principle
confirmed in the Outcome Document, is this really necessary anymore? The so-called
precursors will invariably fall into the other three categories recognized by the Summit
of Heads of State and Government, namely crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
ethnic cleansing. And, since there is a responsibility to protect when these are evident,
does ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ really add anything?
The Outcome Document might well have used the term ‘‘atrocity’’ as a synonym for
‘‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.’’ By my reading
of Scheffer’s proposal, he would be happy enough if we conceded that the two
expressions describe the same reality. Certainly they appear to have much the same
legal significance.
A historical approach is helpful in understanding why Scheffer’s proposal may well
be an idea whose time has come. Although a continuing distinction between genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes may have little or no legal significance
today, an examination of the development of these concepts explains why the
classifications exist (and also why the classifications are less and less important).
In 1943, the UN War Crimes Commission was established by the Allies, for whom the
end of the war was already in sight. They were determined to hold the Nazis personally
accountable for the crimes they had committed. The name of the commission says it all:
it was to prosecute ‘‘war crimes,’’ a category whose parameters were well understood in
international law. In effect, ‘‘war crimes’’ amounted to battlefield offences, committed
amongst combatants, such as the use of prohibited weapons, or treachery, or the abuse
of prisoners of war. ‘‘War crimes’’ also covered violations perpetrated against civilian
nationals of an occupied territory. Full stop. When non-governmental organization
activists asked the War Crimes Commission what would be done with respect to Nazi
atrocities committed within Germany against German nationals, they were told this
was simply beyond the scope of international law.
Rather quickly, the debate evolved, and there was growing willingness to
contemplate prosecution of what were initially called ‘‘persecutions, exterminations
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and deportations’’ of ‘‘any civilian population.’’ Sometimes, the experts also called them
‘‘atrocities,’’ perhaps the first technical use of the term that Scheffer now proposes to
place at the center of international humanitarian law or, rather, to give its own rubric,
‘‘atrocity law.’’ The Allies ultimately agreed to try the Nazis for such crimes, which
they labelled ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ in the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.5
Nervous about the danger that this would set a precedent by which Britain, France,
the United States, and the Soviet Union might themselves be held responsible for
‘‘persecutions, exterminations and deportations’’ of their own subject peoples, the
victorious Allies added a condition for the prosecution of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’:
they had to be committed in the context of an international armed conflict. This was
explained at the London Conference rather candidly by Justice Robert Jackson, the
representative of the United States:
It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from time
immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not ordinarily our
business; that is to say, the way Germany treats its inhabitants, or any other country
treats its inhabitants is not our affair any more than it is the affair of some other
government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this program of
extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an
international concern is this: it was a part of a plan for making an illegal war.
Unless we have a war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no
basis for dealing with atrocities. They were a part of the preparation for war or for the
conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany and that makes them
our concern.6

Jackson added the reason for the reluctance of the United States to extend the
concept of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ to acts committed in peacetime: ‘‘We have some
regrettable circumstances at times in our own country in which minorities are unfairly
treated.’’7 The British, French, and Russians obviously shared such concerns.
This narrow scope of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’—or ‘‘atrocities,’’ to use Scheffer’s
preferred nomenclature—was confirmed in the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg. Although there was much evidence of pre-war atrocities, the
tribunal only found Nazi leaders guilty of crimes against humanity perpetrated after
1 September 1939, when the war began.8 This hypocritical limitation on crimes against
humanity did not sit well with many smaller states, bound by their colonial heritage.
At the first session of the UN General Assembly, in the weeks that followed the
Nuremberg judgment, they set aside the term ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ and instead
insisted that a cognate category of international crime be developed, one that would
have no nexus with war. Cuba’s Ernesto Dihigo, who directed the initiative, told
the General Assembly that the Nuremberg trials had precluded punishment of
certain atrocities because they had been committed before the beginning of the war.
Fearing they might remain unpunished owing to the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege, the representative from Cuba asked that ‘‘genocide’’ be declared an international
crime.9 The process concluded two years later in the adoption of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). Article 1 of the UNCG
declares that genocide can be committed ‘‘in time of peace or in time of war.’’10
The difference between ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ and ‘‘genocide,’’ then, was that
the former could only be committed ‘‘in time of war.’’ Of course, the two categories of
international crime were also defined somewhat differently. Whereas ‘‘crimes against
humanity’’ covered a broad range of acts of persecution and other atrocities, directed
against any civilian population, ‘‘genocide’’ was confined to the intentional destruction
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of a limited catalogue of protected groups. This had been the price of the UNCG: states
would only agree to the international criminalization in peacetime of an extreme form
of atrocity. For these reasons, there was no Convention on Crimes against Humanity,
a gap in international law that was really only closed with the adoption of the Rome
Statute of the ICC in July 1998.11
A similar process can be discerned with respect to ‘‘war crimes.’’ Although they
were well recognized in international law even prior to World War II, violations were
confined to international armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions added
important obligations, requiring that states ensure the repression of war crimes
through investigation, prosecution, or, where appropriate, extradition. However, these
duties applied only to a rather narrow subset of war crimes known as ‘‘grave breaches.’’
And so, by the end of the 1940s, this is how things stood. Within international
armed conflict, criminal law authorized the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. It imposed an obligation to prosecute, however, only with
respect to genocide and ‘‘grave breaches’’ of the Geneva Conventions. It implicitly
recognized universal jurisdiction with respect to grave breaches, but not with respect
to genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes falling short of grave breaches.
The only violations punishable when committed in peacetime, or in non-international
armed conflict, had to meet the narrow confines of the definition of genocide. The only
treaty obligation conferring jurisdiction upon the International Court of Justice was
found in the UNCG. There was a duty to prevent—today we might call this the
‘‘responsibility to protect’’—with respect to violations of the Geneva Conventions
committed in international (but not non-international) armed conflict and with respect
to genocide.
This was a confusing patchwork indeed. Experts might quarrel with a few of the
distinctions I have made as to the obligations that obtained at the time. But some
general themes are unquestionable. By the end of the 1940s there were the very clear
beginnings of the elaborate system of international humanitarian law that we know
today. But it was characterized by drastic limitations with respect to the definitions of
crimes and the obligations they imposed.
Today, all of this has changed. It is this dramatic development that provides the
underpinning for Scheffer’s proposal.
Here is where things stand today: the concepts of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ and
‘‘war crimes’’ have been dramatically extended so that there is now a relatively
seamless body of ‘‘atrocity law’’ covering all serious violations of human rights.
Variously defined as grave breaches, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and serious violations of international humanitarian law,
they ensure that all atrocities are subject to international criminal prosecution.
The obligations that flow from these definitions are also much expanded from the
1940s. It is now generally agreed that universal jurisdiction applies to all serious
violations of international humanitarian law. Some 104 states have now confirmed this
obligation by ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC. Besides imposing the obligation on
them as a matter of treaty law, it also ensures that where national justice systems fail,
the ICC may step in. Finally, it is accepted that states also have a duty to intervene
through collective action where such acts are taking place in other countries. This
‘‘responsibility to protect’’ was affirmed in the 2005 Outcome Document, as has already
been explained.
The result, then, is that there are almost no distinctions to be made in terms
of the legal consequences that flow from characterizing a crime as ‘‘genocide,’’
34

Semantics or Substance?

or ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ or ‘‘war crimes.’’ There is only one difference of any
significance: the 1948 UNCG gives jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice in
the event of disputes between state parties. No comparable provision exists for crimes
against humanity or war crimes. Still, even states that have not ratified the UNCG but
have accepted the general jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice may be
sued in that forum for serious violations of international humanitarian law and
human-rights law, as the 19 December 2005 judgment in the case of Democratic
Republic of Congo v. Uganda demonstrated.12
The logical consequence of Scheffer’s suggestion may be to abandon altogether
use of the terms ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and ‘‘war crimes.’’ He doesn’t
say this, but others will surely draw such a conclusion, or suggest that this is the
implied consequence. In terms of international law, he is absolutely right. As I have
explained, there is no longer any meaningful legal distinction between the various
categories. Prosecutions will be streamlined, and intervention facilitated, by putting
an end to quarrels about the technical definitions of such crimes, much of them drafted
in ‘‘archaic’’ terminology (George W. Bush’s former Attorney General would say
‘‘quaint’’).
Of course, the term ‘‘genocide’’ will not disappear. Its place in the English language
(and others, too) is simply too important. But future debates may be more about
symbolism than about legal detail. To the Armenians, for example, it seems terribly
important that their victimization be described as ‘‘genocide.’’ It is doubtful that they
could compromise with the Turks by calling the events of 1915 an ‘‘atrocity,’’ or even
‘‘crimes against humanity’’ for that matter (although that was the taxonomy at the
time).13 But this is not simply a matter of historical usage. Even today, there is
animated debate about whether or not the atrocities being committed in Darfur should
be described as genocide. The 2005 Commission of Inquiry said they shouldn’t, but
went on to explain that as crimes against humanity and war crimes the acts
perpetrated were just as serious. Like genocide, they are subject to universal
jurisdiction, to international prosecution, and to a duty to intervene (as the Outcome
Document confirmed later the same year). Yet the impeccable reasoning of the Darfur
commission has hardly deterred its critics, who have condemned the refusal to use the
term ‘‘genocide’’ as trivialization and betrayal.
Once we agree that most of the legal nuances that once justified treating
‘‘genocide’’ as a distinct category no longer apply, the usage of the term is free to evolve.
There are two directions in which this evolution can take place. One would be to insist
upon a narrow construction so as to preserve the terrible stigma associated with the
word. The other is to broaden genocide’s scope so that it covers a range of atrocities
falling short of the intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group. In the past, the second view tended to prevail, reflected in much of the
academic literature as well as in expert studies, such as Ben Whitaker’s report to the
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights.14 But to a large extent the momentum to
enlarge the definition of genocide came from frustration at the incomplete coverage
that international law provided for atrocity crimes. Until recently, there was lingering
uncertainty about international criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity
committed in peacetime, or for war crimes committed in international armed conflict.
In 1994 many argued for a duty to intervene not because there was some overarching
‘‘responsibility to protect’’ in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and ethnic cleansing—a premise that seemed dubious at the time in public
international law—but because the argument for intervention was premised on the
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text of the UNCG, where a duty to prevent was set out (albeit vaguely). Ditto in 1999
with respect to Kosovo. That is what drove David Scheffer’s campaign for recognition of
an antechamber of genocide known as ‘‘precursors,’’ as his article explains.
My preference would be to restrict the definition of genocide in order to ensure its
stigma. I understand the views of those who see things otherwise, and respect their
opinions. Because we are now dealing with semantics rather than law, the final
judgment is more likely to be determined by the editors of the Oxford English
Dictionary than by judges in some international tribunal. Linguistic quibbles
notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that, in terms of the substance of serious
violations of international humanitarian law, the historic boundaries have largely
disappeared. From this perspective, David Scheffer’s proposal makes good sense.
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France et al. v. Göring et al., (1946) 22 IMT 203, 13 ILR 203, American Journal of
International Law 41 (1946): 172.
Official Records of the First Session of the General Assembly, Legal Questions, Sixth
Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.22 (29 October 1946).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998).
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), International Court of Justice, 19 December 2005. See also Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004.
On 24 May 1915 the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia made a declaration
asserting that ‘‘in the presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization, the allied Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will hold
personally responsible for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well
as those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres.’’ English translation
quoted in United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London: HMSO, 1948), 35.
Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (2 July 1985).

36

Naming Horror: Legal and Political Words
for Mass Atrocities
Martha Minow
Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School

We live at a time when journalists coin phrases like ‘‘compassion fatigue’’ to describe
failures of ordinary outrage and human action against massive killings, famines, and
plagues. Our is a time when mass media and the Internet offer unprecedented
connections among people—and when the top ‘‘hits’’ for Internet searches of ‘‘atrocity’’
and ‘‘nameless crime’’ each produce the Web sites of rock bands,1 even as the ongoing
and vicious brutalities in the Darfur region of the Sudan escalate and Rwanda,
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and still other regions stagger to recover from the legacies of
their own mass atrocities. Other nations participate in the creation and operation of ad
hoc and long-term international criminal institutions, and at times use the United
Nations’ cumbersome mechanisms to name and even condemn mass violence, but fail
to provide swift and effective action to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities.
In this context, one can only welcome David Scheffer’s thoughtful and practical
call to separate the political and legal uses of ‘‘genocide’’ and to devise the broader
category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ for public communication about genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Scheffer’s essay represents the kind of scholarship on vital
international affairs that is most needed. Every page reveals both his on-the-ground
experience as US ambassador-at-large for war crimes and US representative to the
United Nations and his analytic care. His report of barriers to effective action in
response to recent experiences of genocide and mass violence is compelling and
distressing. He identifies four problems: first, the legal requirements for establishing
what is a genocide are stringent and cumbersome and contribute to delays in
international responses; second, the absence of a well-developed idea of stages prior to
but leading to genocide similarly contributes to delays in international responses;
third, the reliance on legal terms in political discourse confuses the demands of each
realm; and, fourth, there is no easy public term for the collection of horrors that
lawyers name ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and harms of comparable
seriousness and massiveness. Therefore, Scheffer recommends the development of new
terms, including ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ and ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
The frustration behind Scheffer’s effort is palpable and telling, and the failures of
national and international response deserve much more serious attention than they
have received.2 But the problems he addresses will not be cured by new words. It is a
matter of some interest that a person of Scheffer’s wisdom and expertise should put his
emphasis in that direction. That choice in itself deserves some discussion, but the
necessary energy would be better spent pursuing better leadership, better media and
educational efforts to mobilize sustained public responsiveness, and the development
of a richer spectrum of available responses to join national and international efforts to
halt mass and dehumanizing violence. I will try to elaborate through three comments.
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First, as attractive as ‘‘naming’’ may seem for changing perceptions
and behavior, renaming legal categories will do little to address
underlying problems of leadership and will
Satisfying legal criteria for genocide for purposes of prosecution is difficult. Diplomats
thinking of launching interventions can get caught up in anticipating the legal
difficulties while something that appears to be a genocide unfolds. But attributing
delays and reluctance to mount national and international responses seems a mistake,
given the more obvious sources of reluctance in apathy, fear, self-interest, and
perceived futility on the parts of national leaders and their constituents. Blaming the
legal categories here is like blaming the legal categories of tort law for the national and
international failures to deal with global warming. The cure will not come from new
words. Instead, we need better leadership and a spectrum of responses to join national
and international efforts to halt mass and dehumanizing violence.
Scheffer perceptively describes the laborious process of defining a particular
atrocity as a genocide3 and attributes the tardiness of national and international
response to this difficulty. He cites the example of Darfur, with eighteen months
passing before the US government named the mass killings and ethnic cleansing in
that region a genocide. Yet, as Scheffer himself states, the obstacles to mobilizing a
national or international response did not disappear, and, in fact, seemed to increase,
after the American determination of genocide. The hopes of advocates that the name
‘‘genocide’’ would propel the United States to act were dashed. The explanation for this
seems to be that the very label implied such an enormous evil that the United States
would have had to be ready to commit as many troops, as much money, and as many
diplomatic resources as might be necessary to stop it—with no assurances as to when
or how such intervention would succeed.
Fears that responding to mass violence will require too much sacrifice, at too high
a cost, or with little assurance of efficacy, explain the failures of response more
persuasively than confusion over whether the events underway deserve the label
‘‘genocide’’ or that of ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’4 Even if labeling were the issue,
‘‘crimes against humanity’’ is already a label that calls for serious response. Indeed, in
its reference to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and persecution, the
definition of crimes against humanity overlaps with the definition of genocide and
surely crosses whatever threshold people may need to indicate horrors of the most
severe order.
The focus on names is understandable, but it is too limited to meet the underlying
concerns. In particular, new names will not undo the reluctance of individuals,
nations, and international organizations to respond to mass violence; this reluctance
has many sources, but no small contribution comes from fear about what is required
for a full and effective response.
Now, why should Scheffer focus on words? It could be that the development of
‘‘genocide’’ as a category—and the story of Raphael Lemkin’s one-person campaign—is
so inspiring that a new campaign, with new words, seems promising.5 Indeed,
Lemkin’s is a heroic tale, and nongovernmental groups as well as UN agencies and
nation-states can now engage in different kinds of debates because there is now a
category for the intentional effort to eliminate an entire group of people. Lemkin
rightly identified first the mass killings of Armenians and then the Holocaust as
atrocities of a specific nature—plans to destroy a whole people—that had no prior
label; that is not the difficulty today, in part because the international community then
developed the notions of genocide and crimes against humanity. In addition, we now
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have the object lesson of our experience with the invention of the legal category of
genocide. That word generated a convention and diplomatic activities, but its existence
has not halted the numbers or rate of horrors that fit under its definition. There is no
evidence from this instance that a word alone will make the difference in mobilizing
action. And unless words alone make the difference, there is no reason to believe that a
new phrase would not fall victim to the same dynamic—a sense of enormous stakes
met with reluctance to interfere in another nation’s activities, reluctance to go down
the road that leads to military action.
Perhaps Scheffer means to tap into the sense of urgency and condemnation that
comes when a collection of events in the world becomes understood as violating
fundamental human rights. Something in this direction may have happened when the
international criminal tribunals began to acknowledge mass rapes as evidence
of genocide.6 In a different context, the legal terms ‘‘sexual harassment’’ and
‘‘environmental racism’’ have provided legal and practical avenues for addressing
harms that people had experienced but that had not been condemned through public
institutions.7 Those of us who have chosen legal careers hope that law can mobilize
action and produce change. But the hammer of legal categories does not make
everything a nail. Our own specific professional expertise may, in fact, be a very
limited contribution to addressing massive problems. Work on political mobilization,
more thoughtful media messages that reduce the risk of ‘‘compassion fatigue,’’ analysis
of strategic political interests capacious enough to include reputation and humanrights values, and the development of a range of sanctions and other tools are among
the directions that seem more likely to reach the roots of the failures of nations to act
in response to mass atrocity.
The risk of overemphasizing lawyers’ categories as solutions should not obscure
the degree to which existing law actually can, with the right leadership, accomplish
a fair amount of what Scheffer wants. For example, the new phrase ‘‘precursors to
genocide’’ is meant to fill a gap and to trigger earlier recognition of actions giving rise
to a genocide, before large numbers of killings have occurred. Yet even without that
phrase, the current legal framework already recognizes, condemns, and authorizes
prosecution and punishment for steps on the way to genocide: article 3 of the UNCG
criminalizes
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
These terms may not fully communicate to political leaders and ordinary citizens
the warning signals of severe violations of human rights, however, and communication
along these lines may be what Scheffer means to prompt by devising the concept of
‘‘precursors to genocide.’’ Similarly, it would help if states could generate more options
than verbal condemnation, economic sanctions, and military action in order to meet early
warning signals of potential genocides with proportionate and meaningful responses.

Second, for public communication, the term ‘‘atrocity crime’’ loses the
specificity of ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ without
offering clarity in return
For ease of communication, I certainly understand Scheffer’s reasons for proposing a
general category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to group together what currently get the labels
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‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and ‘‘war crimes.’’ Yet despite his hope to break
free from legalistic definitions, I find myself wondering about the exact referents for
‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ Would the phrase simply scoop up all acts currently covered by
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes? Only some of them? Or more than
them? Some of the confusion comes from the fact that the term ‘‘atrocity’’ is already in
use: in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s definition of ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’8
in definitions of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,9 and in at least one
nation’s effort to define universal jurisdiction.10
Even in writing this short commentary, I have struggled to find words to describe
the topic of concern and have at times used ‘‘atrocity,’’ ‘‘massive killings,’’ and ‘‘massive
violence.’’ None of the terms is adequate. Using ‘‘genocide,’’ however, taps into the
hard-won arguments about the truly heinous nature of orchestrated efforts to destroy
a people. ‘‘Crimes against humanity’’ has the benefit of underscoring that the interests
of all of humanity are at stake and also the unacceptability of denying the humanity of
victims.11 A general term would be useful to identify the range of these offenses, plus
war crimes, and ‘‘atrocity’’ may be as good as any; but perhaps the very awkwardness
of locution should remain—as a partial acknowledgment of the incommensurability of
human language and responses to the horrors at hand.12

Third, doing something to get people to think and act is crucial
I endorse entirely Scheffer’s effort to stand back from particular conflicts to consider
what national and global initiatives could lift us from the dismal patterns that join
heinous violence with tardy and insufficient international responses. Even if others
join me in criticizing his particular proposals, he has accomplished no small part of his
goal if he gets people to engage with the difficulties. The debate makes me think we
need to spend more time understanding the sources of resistance—by individuals, by
nations, by international organizations—if we are to devise more meaningful and
timely responses to mass atrocities.
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David Scheffer’s article is extremely rich and provides cause for thought concerning
the concepts of genocide and atrocity crimes. His two proposals—liberating the use
of the term ‘‘genocide’’ from manipulation by governments and international
organizations and, more generally, substituting the new concepts of ‘‘atrocity
crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ for the actual legal, political, and public terminology used
regarding the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—call for
some observations.
In his first proposal, Scheffer means to distinguish between the legal and the
political application of the concept of genocide in order to enable a better prevention of
the crime through faster action. If the legal application of the concept of genocide is
indeed constrained by specific and rigorous requirements,1 the political application
should be, according to Scheffer, larger and more flexible, thus permitting intervention
as soon as precursors of genocide are identified. This idea of separating the criminal
character of genocide from its political reality is appealing, and the focus on the need
for a more effective international action to intervene is definitely important.
It is, nevertheless, possible to look at this issue from a different angle, thus
reversing Scheffer’s proposal: focusing on the legal application of intervention—as
a tool for prevention, since this is the ultimate goal here—rather than on a political
application of genocide. As a matter of fact, I feel uneasy with the distinction made
between a legal and a political application of the concept of genocide. According to
Scheffer, the former is meant for the purpose of repression by prosecutors and courts,
as opposed to the latter, which is meant for the purpose of intervention by governments
and international organizations (particularly the United Nations). In my view, the
legal definition of genocide is, and should remain, applicable in all cases. Of course,
criminal repression, on the one hand, and diplomatic, economic, or (in the worst case)
military intervention, on the other, are two different type of actions that do not involve
identical stakes, nor do they have identical consequences. But both are based on legal
definitions and provided for in legal frameworks. Therefore, my suggestion is that an
effective and rapid action to intervene in an ‘‘atrocity zone’’ should be determined not
necessarily by a liberal understanding of genocide but, rather, by a sharper legal
understanding of intervention.
This approach would have three main advantages. First, it would permit the
avoidance of a simplified use of ‘‘genocide’’ that might lead to more confusion between
this concept and those of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ and ‘‘war crimes,’’ or end up
trivializing what is meant to be the ‘‘crime of crimes.’’2 Second, it would provide an
occasion to clear up the fuzziness surrounding the terms ‘‘prevention’’ and
‘‘intervention’’ from a legal point of view. Third, it would actually liberate the
international community from the need for any legal qualification attesting to or
Sévane Garibian, ‘‘A Commentary on David Scheffer’s Concepts of Genocide and Atrocity
Crimes.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, 1 (April 2007): 43–50. ß 2007 Genocide Studies and
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certifying the existence of genocide as an exclusive precondition of intervention3 and
would give even more strength—as we will see—to Scheffer’s second proposal.
In this second proposal, Scheffer sets out to render the description of genocide
and other atrocities meriting effective governmental and organizational responses
(crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and aggression)
more accurate. He therefore suggests the use of a new concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
as violations of ‘‘atrocity law’’ (a mix of international criminal law, international
human-rights law, international humanitarian law, and the law of war). There are
two main reasons to support this proposal. From a practical point of view, the
terms ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ have the great merit of addressing
a complex corpus of different criminal acts described in multiple norms of international
law, thus providing a unified and simplified (rather than accurate) description or
denomination—in other words, a useful ‘‘conceptual short cut.’’ Just as the word
‘‘feline’’ refers to many animals, the words ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’
respectively refer, in a strongly expressive (almost ‘‘visual’’) way, to diverse acts and
norms related to the most serious international crimes. From a legal point of view,
Scheffer’s second proposal is very attractive, since it reflects the spirit underlying
the work of codification4 done by both the International Law Commission (ILC) and
the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is
manifested in four key ways:
(1) Scheffer’s ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ as violations of ‘‘atrocity law’’ are actually nothing
more than the ‘‘crimes against the peace and security of mankind’’ mentioned
in the 1996 ILC Draft Code5 (crimes against UN and associated personnel
excluded)6 or the ‘‘most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole’’ of the 1998 ICC Rome Statute.7 Moreover, this corpus
of international crimes, which Scheffer refers to as ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ initially
formed part of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)8 and for Rwanda
(ICTR).9 Scheffer’s definition of each of these crimes is based on the two
tribunals’ case law. This choice is coherent and appropriate because the
aforesaid case law is itself grounded on international customary law, notably
interpreted in the light of the 1996 ILC Draft Code,10 and also greatly
influenced the drafting of the 1998 ICC Statute.11
(2) The idea that ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ have in common the fact of being particularly
heinous acts of an orchestrated character, significant magnitude, and severe
gravity, committed in time of war or in time of peace, summarizes perfectly the
approach expressed in the work of the ILC, the ad hoc international judges,
and the drafters of the Rome Statute, as well as the work of major legal
scholars: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are perceived as
being ‘‘core crimes’’ of international law, constituting violations of imperative
international customary norms—or jus cogens norms12—that protect human
dignity and concerning the international community of sovereign states as a
whole.13
(3) As noted by Scheffer, the term ‘‘atrocity law’’ offers an opportunity to correct
the inaccurate general reference to ‘‘international humanitarian law’’ (i.e., the
law of armed conflicts, which does not concern genocide or crimes against
humanity committed outside the ambit of armed conflict) as the field of
international law covering the crimes in question. More precisely, it actually
acknowledges the international criminal tribunals’ broad interpretation
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of this body of law, which goes beyond both the text of their statutes14 and
the recommendations of the UN secretary-general,15 in accordance with the
ILC Draft Code and with the Rome Statute.
(4) Finally, Scheffer’s second proposal allows for the description of ‘‘what a state
appears responsible for committing’’16 and not only what individuals are
internationally held accountable for. Thus, in his estimation, ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
generate individual as well as state international responsibility. As sensitive
as the issue of state responsibility is, such a suggestion does build a bridge
connecting the ILC Draft Code and the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC statutes
(all related to individual criminal responsibility)17 with the 2001 ILC Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.18
It is particularly interesting at this point to remember that, in its first
works on state responsibility, the ILC distinguished international ‘‘delicts’’
and ‘‘crimes’’—the latter referring to violations of ‘‘superior norms’’ of
international law, which implicitly meant peremptory norms of jus cogens.19
Even though the very controversial term ‘‘international state crimes’’ has
since been abandoned, the ILC Draft Articles adopts a close distinction
between ‘‘internationally wrongful acts’’ and ‘‘serious breaches of obligations
under peremptory norms of general international law.’’20 It would, accordingly, be possible to understand the latter as including breaches of obligations
under atrocity law—in other words, including atrocity crimes.21 This
possibility is confirmed by the ILC Draft Articles’ commentary on art. 40,
which defines the scope of application of those ‘‘serious breaches’’: after noting
that ‘‘it is not appropriate to set out examples of the peremptory norms
referred to in the text of article 40 itself, any more than it was in the text of
article 53 of the Vienna Convention,’’22 the drafters affirm that basic rules of
international humanitarian law and prohibitions on aggression, genocide, and
crimes against humanity are to be regarded as such.23
For all these reasons, I not only support Scheffer’s second proposal but also
believe that, looking back to the initial goal of this discussion (that is, to think
out more effective actions to intervene and protect civilian populations), his concept
of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’—as violations of atrocity law binding on individuals and
states—should be taken into consideration for a better legal understanding of
intervention.
Scheffer seems to associate the terms ‘‘intervention’’ and ‘‘prevention’’—the latter
being used in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG).24 He therefore presupposes that international intervention is
determined by the existence of acts of genocide—hence his first proposal to liberate
the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ from strict legal requirements in order to stimulate the
international community to act more quickly. In my opinion, this presupposition is
nevertheless questionable, for two reasons. First, intervention and prevention are not
necessarily interchangeable: on the one hand, international intervention may be
punitive (notably in the case of judicial intervention, such as the creation of the
international criminal tribunals by the UN Security Council); on the other, prevention
may be independent from any international intervention (in the case of national
preventive measures such as, for example, the prohibition of genocide in domestic law).
Second, the use of the term ‘‘prevention’’ in the UNCG is actually unclear,25 and
‘‘nowhere does the Genocide Convention recognize that individual States or the
international community acting in concert may or must intervene in order to prevent
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the crime.’’26 Article 1 of the UNCG definitely sets out an erga omnes obligation
to prevent (and to punish),27 but whether the scope of this obligation includes a duty of
humanitarian intervention is uncertain and controversial.28 David Scheffer himself, as
the US ambassador for war crimes at the time, expressed in late 1998 the view that
there is no such legal obligation in the strict sense of the term.29
The fact remains that art. 8 of the UNCG authorizes the contracting parties to
‘‘call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under
the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention . . . of acts of genocide.’’ The reference to the UN Charter is a key
element in better understanding intervention (putting aside the question of whether
it is a right or an obligation implicitly provided for in the UNCG), since its legal basis
is, after all, chapter 7 of that charter. As an exception to the general principles of
sovereign equality (art. 2, §1)30 and non-intervention (art. 2, §4, §7),31 the second
sentence of art. 2, §732 of the UN Charter enables the application of enforcement
measures under chapter 7 related to action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. International intervention is indeed
justified under the law of the United Nations as soon as, in the Security Council’s
discretionary estimation,33 peace and security are threatened. Now, on this particular
point, both the Security Council34 and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals35
consider that the ‘‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’’ committed
in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda—that is, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, which together constitute Scheffer’s category of ‘‘atrocity
crimes’’—constitute such a threat. As a result, ‘‘[t]he implicit philosophy is that gross
human rights violations anywhere are a threat to peace and security everywhere’’36
and justify (just as breaches of peace and aggression do) an action to intervene on the
grounds of chapter 7.
More specifically, in the light of the preceding developments, it is possible to
understand intervention, legally speaking, as a collective action authorized by the
Security Council37 and determined by the occurrence of atrocity crimes (or violations of
atrocity law) that are deemed a threat to international peace and security, within the
meaning of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This apprehension of intervention, connected
with Scheffer’s concept of atrocity crimes on the basis of the normative developments
notably generated by the crises in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, can lead to a
more effective action of the international community in an ‘‘atrocity zone,’’ thus
extending the legal scope of intervention to the most serious international crimes
against fundamental human values, for the protection of civilians and in the interest of
the whole international community.
Of course, that said, and as pointed out by others, support for the international
implementation of minimum human rights in the face of severe governmental abuses
and criminality should not disguise the risk of a postcolonial revival of interventionary
diplomacy.38 The key is finding a ‘‘proper balance in particular situations as between
sovereign rights and humanitarian intervention’’39—a balance that depends, in the
last instance, on the motives behind the political will of the Security Council to use—or
not to use—its discretionary power, or on the scale of the interventionary operation
required and its evaluation, not to mention the decision-making process within the
principal organ of the United Nations often criticized for the hegemony of the United
States.40 All these elements relate to the important and ongoing debate over the forms
of legality review of Security Council decisions, ‘‘subject to respect for peremptory
norms of international law.’’41
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When Raphael Lemkin invented the word ‘‘genocide’’ in 1944, he explained that this is
a ‘‘new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern
development.’’1 As Lemkin wrote these words, the paradigmatic genocide, the
Holocaust, was raging in Europe.
Since Lemkin was a lawyer, he put great weight on both national and international
legal rules as one of the best tools to prevent and eventually eradicate this
‘‘old practice.’’ His response was to propose an international crime for which
individuals committing such acts against a group of people—whom he labeled
‘‘a collectivity’’—could be punished, irrespective of national boundaries. In effect,
Lemkin was proposing the now-accepted rule of universal jurisdiction, whereby
individuals committing certain heinous crimes are considered hostis humani
generis—enemies of all humankind—and can be prosecuted by any national or
international court, regardless of where the crime was committed.2
It is the legalistic background of the inventor and the purpose for which the term
was invented—to make certain group behavior an international crime recognized by
the community of nations as illegal through a multilateral treaty—that put the term
‘‘genocide’’ solidly within a legal framework.
The culmination of Lemkin’s work during his lifetime was the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1948 and entering into force in 1951. More than 130 states today
are parties to the UNCG, in whose article 1 they solemnly ‘‘undertake to prevent and
punish’’ genocide.3 How states are to do so is left unstated in the treaty.
Though Lemkin died impoverished and in relative obscurity in 1959, his word has
achieved a recognition beyond his dreams. ‘‘Genocide’’ has now become synonymous
with extreme evil and, as noted by William Schabas, the ‘‘crime of crimes.’’4 A Google
search today yields more than 26 million entries for the term.
Unfortunately, one of the major reasons for its widespread popularity is the failure
of the UNCG to prevent repeated occurrences of this particular extreme evil. While the
term ‘‘genocide’’ should by now be relegated to descriptions of historical events, most
recently the Holocaust, it is instead still being used by those who followed Lemkin to
describe current events. As explained by Gregory Stanton,
When the Genocide Convention was passed by the United Nations in 1948, the world
said, ‘‘Never again.’’ But the history of the twentieth century instead proved that ‘‘never
again’’ became ‘‘again and again.’’ The promise the United Nations made was broken, as
again and again, genocides and other forms of mass murder killed 170 million people,
more than all the international wars of the twentieth century combined.5

As I write this commentary, a genocide is raging in the Darfur region of Sudan
while the international community, in ‘‘Keystone Kops’’ fashion, haplessly
tries to figure out how to respond to the events. Despite massive demonstrations,
Michael J. Bazyler, ‘‘In the Footsteps of Raphael Lemkin.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, 1
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letter-writing campaigns to politicians, public appeals, and extensive coverage
by the media, the genocide in Darfur continues unabated. As Jerry Fowler recently
explained in a more elegant manner,
Darfur adds another sad chapter of irony in the convention’s history, given the dramatic
incongruity between the sense of urgency that one might expect a plausible case of
ongoing genocide to engender and the relatively lackadaisical international political
response that has in fact unfolded.6

The failure of the international community to stop the Rwandan genocide of 1994,
during which approximately one million victims were murdered over a period of 100
days, provides another sad and sorry example of the ‘‘again and again’’ phenomenon.
As we approach the half-century mark of Lemkin’s death, it is a great blot on both
international law and international diplomacy that we have failed miserably to make
his dream into reality and relegate genocide to the trash bin of history.
Not that we haven’t tried. Numerous proposals, some put into practice, have been
offered over the last fifty years to make the work of genocide prevention more effective.
The topic has also been the subject of numerous books, articles, policy papers, and
speeches.7
In the 1970s, Israel Charny and Chanan Rapaport devised the Genocide Early
Warning System (GEWS), an analytic process by which to recognize preludes to
genocide so that effective action can be taken before events on the ground escalate into
full-blown genocide. GEWS is based on the fact that genocides, including the
Holocaust, are never spontaneous events; rather, they occur incrementally, in
predictable steps.8
In the 1990s, Gregory Stanton addressed the same issue and gave us an important
tool by likewise identifying the signposts on the road to genocide. Stanton explains that
‘‘genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not
inexorable. At each stage, preventive measures can stop it. The later stages must be
preceded by the earlier stages, though earlier stages continue to operate throughout
the process.’’9
At the policy level, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan took a stab at the task in
2004 by creating the position of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and
appointing Juan Méndez, law professor, human rights advocate, and former political
prisoner from Argentina, to the post. Events in Darfur demonstrate, at least to date,
that the addition of such a special adviser for genocide prevention at the UN has had
little effect in the real world. In 1997, the Clinton administration in the United States
had created a new post in the US State Department, the US Ambassador at Large for
War Crimes Issues, with a similar mandate to focus on genocide and other large-scale
violations of international criminal law. The creation of this post has likewise had, at
most, a negligible effect on the task of genocide prevention and the current holder of
the position, John Clint Williamson, seems to play a minor role in the State
Department. Prior to Williamson’s appointment in April 2006, the post was vacant for
six months.
David Scheffer, the first ambassador for war crimes issues and currently a law
professor at Northwestern University, now offers another proposal to make genocide
prevention more effective.
Scheffer correctly points out that the legal definition of genocide, as found in
the UNCG, has acted to constrain genocide prevention, since it offers both the
United Nations and individual nations a ready-made legal excuse not to take action. It
allows them to claim that the acts being committed, while horrible, have not yet risen
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to the level of genocide as set out in the legal definition, with its hard-to-meet
requirement of specific intent. As Scheffer puts it, ‘‘The prospect of the term ‘genocide’
arising in policy making too often puts an intimidating brake on effective responses.’’10
Thus, while the genocide in Rwanda was ongoing, the Clinton administration shied
away from calling the events a ‘‘genocide,’’ since it was believed that the use of the
‘‘G-word’’ required action.
Scheffer proposes that the ‘‘political use of the term should be separated from its
legal definition as a crime of individual responsibility. Governments and international
organizations should be allowed to apply the term genocide more readily within
a political context.’’ In Scheffer’s terms, they should be ‘‘liberated so as to publicly
describe precursors of genocide and react rapidly to prevent or to stop mass killings or
other seeming acts of genocide.’’11 How to do this? Scheffer suggests that a new phrase
be employed to describe the coming storm of genocide: ‘‘precursors of genocide,’’ which
he argues is ‘‘useful, pragmatic and sufficiently diplomatic to employ without
necessarily triggering some of the intimidating consequences of charges of genocide.’’12
The phrase ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ also has the advantage of using the G-word to
bring public and media attention to the events—as perhaps no other word can
do—while at the same time qualifying it to imply that we have not yet reached the
worst of the situation but may do so if rapid action is not taken. It also allows the
politicians and diplomats to do their job without the lawyers’ coming in and mucking
up the situation by pointing out that specific intent and other legal elements of
the crime cannot be shown.
Scheffer then goes one step further by proposing the use of another new term—
‘‘atrocity crimes’’—in both political and legal contexts to cover those acts that warrant
action. Atrocity crimes, in Scheffer’s lexicon, constitute not only genocide but those
crimes that are precursors to genocide and to which, in any case, either an
international or a national response is required: namely, crimes against humanity
and serious war crimes. In effect, Scheffer concludes that the term ‘‘genocide’’ carries
too much baggage and thus weighs down decision makers (whether at the United
Nations or in individual governments), preventing them from responding to events
that occur in his so-termed ‘‘atrocity zone.’’
Scheffer’s proposal is modest, and he concedes that ‘‘what is
proposed . . . supplements the many [other] proposals on genocide prevention.’’13
Following in the footsteps of Lemkin, Scheffer focuses, as he puts it, ‘‘on the
terminology employed.’’14 He suggests that, through the use of different terminology,
both the international community as a whole and individual nations will be able
to trespond more nimbly to threats of impending genocide. One of the most effective
ways to prevent or suppress a genocide, Scheffer seems to be saying, is to avoid
actually using the term.
Scheffer’s proposal of shunning the term ‘‘genocide’’ is limited to diplomatic
contexts, or what he calls ‘‘the political application of the term’’;15 he recognizes that
genocide also has a ‘‘legal application’’ and a ‘‘historical application.’’16
In the legal arena, the term ‘‘genocide’’ requires an act of looking backward, used
in prosecuting individuals—before either an international court or a domestic
tribunal—to determine whether their prior conduct meets the mens rea and actus
reus elements of the crime of genocide as set out in the UNCG. The historical use of
the term demonstrates another instance of a process of looking backward, involving
efforts by various aggrieved groups—such as the victims and heirs of the Armenian
Genocide or of Stalin’s Holodomor in the Ukraine in the 1930s—to have both the
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international community and individual nations agree that past crimes committed
against them can also be stamped with the ultimate term of opprobrium.
In both of these instances, the use of Lemkin’s word is perfectly proper. The crime
of genocide is ‘‘on the books’’ of international law and must be called by its proper
name. In keeping with the seriousness of the offense, the legal requirements of
the crime are difficult to meet. In those situations where acts by perpetrators
do amount to genocidal behavior, the term ‘‘genocide’’ must be used. Similarly,
if a historical event, including one that occurred before the enactment of the UNCG,
bears substantial similarity to events already recognized as a genocide—whether it be
the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide—the term ‘‘genocide’’ must be used to describe
that event. It is a tribute to the enormous popularity of the term that, for the aggrieved
victim group, no other term—whether it be ‘‘genocidal massacre,’’ ‘‘a genocide-like
event,’’ ‘‘crime against humanity,’’ ‘‘politicide’’ or ‘‘democide,’’ or even Scheffer’s
‘‘atrocity’’—will do.
In the political arena, where we are not looking backward but attempting an
accurate description of current events, the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ now appears, as
Scheffer points out, to have a hindering rather than a helpful effect. Again, this effect
is due to the enormous emotional impact that the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ produces.
Because it clouds the issue rather than clarifying reality, and can indeed act as an
obstacle to genocide prevention, then, on purely practical grounds, Scheffer’s
suggestion that the use of the G-word is best avoided is sound.
Scheffer’s second proposal—that genocides, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and other crimes that can be prosecuted before international and hybrid tribunals be
given the generic name ‘‘atrocity’’—also has the advantage of using just one word to
describe a host of crimes that have complex and hard-to-understand legal meanings
and which at the same time also overlap with one another. Why try to find the precise
legal term for the ongoing events, Scheffer argues, when the ‘‘unifying term’’ so ‘‘easily
and accurately describe[s] the totality of these crimes?’’17 Since the term ‘‘atrocity,’’ as
Scheffer points out, also has no legal meaning, it ironically has the advantage over the
term ‘‘genocide,’’ since its use by politicians and diplomats has no legal ramifications.
Scheffer, however, is not satisfied for the term ‘‘atrocity’’ to be used only by
politicians, diplomats, the media, and the public. The final part of his proposal calls for
the adoption of the term ‘‘atrocity law’’ into the legal lexicon. ‘‘Atrocity law’’ is meant to
describe the body of international law dealing with the basket of crimes—genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious offenses—over which
international and hybrid criminal tribunals now, or may in the future, have
jurisdiction.18 Scheffer aims to assign to these crimes the generic legal name of
‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
A significant motivation for the adoption of these terms is that, as Scheffer
concedes, they are easily understood by the general public. Their legal adoption will
lead to their popular adoption, and thus should help to bring further prestige to
international tribunals by providing an understandable term to describe to the public
what exactly these tribunals do. ‘‘Atrocity law,’’ as Scheffer aptly explains, is vastly
preferable to terms currently bandied about by international human-rights activists
and before international bodies to describe such crimes in general.19 Such terms—
including ‘‘international humanitarian law,’’ ‘‘international human rights law,’’
‘‘international criminal law,’’ ‘‘military law,’’ and ‘‘laws of war’’—are incomprehensible
to the general public because they overlap, are not well defined, and are used sloppily
not only by the media but also by legal professionals.
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Simplicity is always a worthy goal, and, especially in the opaque worlds of
law and diplomacy, Scheffer’s proposal has much merit. Given that it is meant to be
used in the international arena, the term ‘‘atrocity’’ also has an advantage in
possessing similar-sounding equivalents in other popular diplomatic languages:
atrocite´ in French; atrocidad in Spanish; atrocità in Italian.20
It remains to be seen whether the term will catch on, either in the international
diplomatic arena or with legal scholars, the media, and the general public. At the
time of writing, a Google search of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ yields about 9,210 appearances on
the Internet; ‘‘atrocity law’’ merits only about 648 entries, many of them relating to
Belgium’s controversial universal jurisdiction statute, known in English as the
Anti-Atrocity Law. A fair start for a Lemkin-like campaign that made its first
appearance in print in 2002, with Scheffer’s law-review article ‘‘The Future of
Atrocity Law.’’21
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Introduction
In August 1941, in a live broadcast from London, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill described the atrocities committed by Nazi troops and police under the
German attack on the Soviet Union as something unprecedented: ‘‘Since the Mongol
invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century, there has never been methodical,
merciless butchery on such a scale, or approaching such a scale. And this is but the
beginning. . . . We are in the presence of a crime without a name.’’1 A few years later,
at Nuremberg, because of the lack of international legislation on this very crime,
Hermann Göring and his cronies were not convicted of genocide against Europe’s Jews
or against the Sinti and Roma. The term ‘‘genocide’’ found entry into the language of
only some of the indictments. In fact, as is well known to genocide scholars, the term
‘‘genocide’’ had first been coined in a scholarly publication in 1944, too late for
the Nuremberg trials, and was introduced to international law only in 1948, when the
United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).2 This convention was the result of Polish jurist
Raphael Lemkin’s tireless lobbying of government representatives from around the
world to make genocide an international crime.
Since then, the formerly nameless crime of genocide has come a long way. After a
period of stagnation during the Cold War, it has been included in the statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Before the two UN ad hoc
tribunals, numerous genocide cases have been heard, resulting in an ever-growing
body of case law on the crime of genocide. In one of these cases, ICTR judges labeled
genocide the ‘‘crime of crimes,’’ a phrase often understood to mark a special status.3
Similarly, in a case concerning state responsibility before the International Court
of Justice, counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina called genocide the ‘‘super crime.’’4
In 2004, the UN secretary-general established the office of Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide; in 2006 he added an Advisory Committee on Genocide
Prevention. In academia, Lemkin’s creation of the term ‘‘genocide’’ has given rise to
the field of genocide studies, and this field is indeed thriving: there are, as of this
writing, two international associations of genocide scholars, several international
journals focusing primarily on genocide research, and a fast-growing number of related
university courses around the world.
Despite all these promising developments, genocide as a crime does not seem to
end. There is more talk about genocide and research into genocide than ever before,
and still genocide continues. Most prominently, widespread and systematic attacks on
different tribal groups in the Darfur province of Sudan have over the last two years
been discussed as yet another case of genocide. In fact, much time was spent on the
question of whether the crimes committed against parts of the Darfuri population
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indeed constitute genocide; then, in the spring of 2005, the focus shifted toward
obtaining the consent of the Sudanese government to the deployment of UN
peacekeepers.5
It is in this context that David Scheffer puts forward two interesting proposals
concerning the labeling and classification of the crime of genocide. Scheffer introduces,
first, the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ to describe circumstances that could lead
to genocide. The idea behind this new language is to liberate governments from
‘‘the genocide factor’’—a hesitancy Scheffer believes to exist on the part of governments
to apply the label ‘‘genocide’’ to any given situation. Scheffer posits that governments
should adopt a less restrictive approach to using the term ‘‘genocide’’ and wants to
distinguish legal, political, and historical applications of the term. Second, Scheffer
develops the concept of ‘‘atrocity law,’’ pursuant to which war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide—when certain criteria are met—can all be classified
as ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ According to Scheffer, this special category of international
crimes is needed to ‘‘accurately describe the totality of these crimes.’’6
Scheffer’s proposals are both timely and interesting. Timely because, over the past
several years, much has been written about the genocide-related jurisprudence
of the ad hoc tribunals but little light has been shed on the meaning of the genocide
label and determination for issues of intervention and prevention.7 Equally,
the description of genocide as the ‘‘crime of crimes’’ has found its way into many
writings and speeches, but little time has been spent on contemplating the
implications of such an alleged hierarchy of crimes. Scheffer’s proposals are interesting
because he does not give in to the usual reflex of genocide scholars to simply criticize
the legal definition of genocide; instead, he attempts to increase the practical
applicability of the concept of genocide to international politics. With a view to making
genocide prevention more effective, this undertaking can only be welcomed.
In what follows I will not analyze Scheffer’s proposals from a legal perspective
(i.e., comment on the notion of atrocity law and its relation to other, existing legal
categories).8 Instead, I will look at them from the perspective of genocide prevention,
arguing that Scheffer’s suggestion to use the formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ repeats
the mistakes decision makers and scholars have made with respect to the genocide
in Rwanda and the conflict in Darfur. Outside the research community, following
Scheffer’s advice would be counterproductive and would inadvertently keep genocide
prevention in what could be called the ‘‘G-word trap’’—that is, a misplaced focus
on a whether a conflict is genocide or not. On Scheffer’s second point, I fully endorse
the concept of atrocity law as a welcome tool to reconceptualize genocide as forming
part of a broader category of massive human-rights violations instead of being in its
own league. I will go a step further and argue that, within the context of genocide
prevention, the label ‘‘genocide’’ should be avoided altogether; using a term such as
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would benefit attempts to prevent genocide. In conclusion, I offer
some observations on how Scheffer’s proposals affect genocide prevention on a more
general level and what implications Scheffer’s notion of atrocity law should have for
the future of genocide studies.

‘‘Precursors of Genocide’’
Scheffer’s first proposal deals with the terminology capturing the societal processes
preceding genocide—processes that genocide scholars such as Gregory H. Stanton,
as well as the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, have
elaborated further.9 The group that is to be singled out as the victim group is classified,
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then discriminated against; its members lose their civil and political rights; they
are dehumanized by way of propaganda and stigmatization; and so on. Scheffer
reviews the practice of the Clinton administration around the Kosovo conflict in 1999
and demonstrates how the situation in Kosovo was assessed. He recalls how the
formulation ‘‘indicators of genocide’’ was used in that connection but now prefers
‘‘precursors of genocide’’ as more exact and appropriate.
The real problem of genocide prevention is to identify the circumstances under
which such situations escalate into genocide—and distinguishing these from situations
in which they do not and any external intervention could be deemed an unjustified
interference in internal affairs. Moreover, it is necessary to signal to policy makers
the importance of timely action to avoid the eventual outbreak of genocidal violence.
International politics are geared more toward crisis management than toward
prevention and early warning. The formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ thus addresses
a complex political issue and is not a term governments easily will adopt and use.
As a former senior official within the US State Department and former US
ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues under the Clinton administration,
Scheffer is only too aware of this. It is his hope that the proposed language of
‘‘precursors of genocide’’ can free governments from the fear of prematurely labeling a
conflict ‘‘genocide’’ and thus lead the way to effective early warnings and genocide
prevention.
The term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ seems, at first sight, a useful and accurate
description of the process leading up to a genocide. Given Scheffer’s experience with
the Clinton administration, in particular his work heading the US government’s
Atrocities Prevention Inter-Agency Working Group, one is inclined to believe that the
‘‘precursors’’ formula may also be a working tool well suited for genocide prevention in
the political context. Currently, both politicians and media often distinguish only
between ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘not genocide,’’ thus missing out on the basic fact that genocide
is a process that includes ‘‘before,’’ ‘‘during,’’ and ‘‘after’’—three essential, but not
always clearly distinguishable, phases. The suggested formula does not focus on
whether genocide is occurring or not, leading to a time-consuming and complex
discussion of evidence, but focuses on the phase preceding genocide.

New Language Where a Paradigm Shift Is Needed
Upon closer scrutiny, however, Scheffer’s proposal, for several reasons, falls short of
bringing progress to the field of genocide prevention. In fact, following his suggestion
would make things worse, which would be contrary to his intentions and would lock
states into the ‘‘G-word trap.’’ The proposal is based on incorrect and partly outdated
assumptions, and, above all, it retains the focus on the term ‘‘genocide’’ instead of
shifting focus away from it. In light of the most recent experiences with the Darfur
crisis, genocide prevention needs not new language but a paradigm shift.

The ‘‘G-Word’’ Has Come of Age—But It Has Also Lost Its Power
Scheffer bases his proposal on two assumptions: that states and other relevant actors
have a hesitancy to use the genocide label, and that genocide prevention would become
more effective if states altered this attitude and used that label more freely. Scheffer’s
view echoes earlier writings about the international community’s, and in particular
the US government’s, response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. At that time
government representatives went to great lengths to avoid using the term ‘‘genocide,’’
fearing that a genocide determination would impose a legal obligation on all parties
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to the UNCG to stop that particular genocide.10 As a consequence, genocide scholars
and non-governmental organizations active in the field of genocide prevention began to
put great effort into labeling ongoing conflicts as genocides (when deemed
appropriate). The hope was that the ‘‘G-word’’ would create public attention, exert
moral pressure, and impose a legal obligation on Western governments to take action
to stop the genocidal violence.11
Times (and legal views) have changed, however. More than ten years later, facing
massive human-rights violations in Darfur, several governments and parliaments,
and, above all, the US administration, repeatedly and early on referred to the situation
as ‘‘genocide.’’12 The assumption underlying Scheffer’s proposal—that states need to
be ‘‘liberated from the genocide factor’’ to use the term ‘‘genocide’’ more often in order
to make genocide prevention effective—is no longer valid; states have in fact begun to
use the term genocide, as it no longer bears the stigma of legal obligation. The sense of
a moral obligation has also faded with the general decrease in support for sending
troops to improve human-rights situations in distant countries. The only place where
the ‘‘G-word’’ seems to retain an aura of moral superiority (for those accusing others of
genocide) is within domestic politics, as seen, for example, in the United States, where
there is an active civil society and journalists—such as Nicholas Kristof of the
New York Times—who are concerned with genocide prevention. This movement in the
United States, however, has not had a similar counterpart in Europe. States can
therefore afford a ‘‘more liberal approach’’ to the ‘‘G-word’’ without risk of becoming
engaged in an armed intervention. This new outlook on the meaning of the ‘‘G-word’’
became crystal clear in the statement made by Colin Powell, then US secretary of
state, to the US Senate announcing the results of an investigation into the crimes
committed in the Darfur region: ‘‘The evidence leads us to the conclusion, the United
States to the conclusion, that genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in
Darfur [. . .] In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination.’’13
In addition, the Darfur crisis has shown that the use of the ‘‘G-word’’ is not
equivalent to actual action on the ground. At the time of writing, it has been more than
two years since the US government declared the government of Sudan guilty of
genocide; in fact, it is more than three months since the UN Security Council adopted
a resolution sanctioning the deployment of about 20,000 UN forces to the Darfur
region—and still the government of Sudan pursues the same policies and rejects the
sending of UN peacekeepers. The use of the ‘‘G-word’’ in the Darfur crisis has neither
helped galvanize broad international support for action to stop the killings nor forced
the Sudanese government to halt its campaign of ethnic cleansings. There appears
to be very little evidence that using the ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ formula with respect
to the next Darfur would change the fact that the ‘‘G-word’’ has lost its power.

Using the ‘‘G-Word’’ Generates Additional Problems
Having noted that the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ (or of any related phrases, such as
‘‘precursors of genocide’’) not only does not contribute to the prevention of genocide, but
actually gives rise to a number of additional problems. It is these problems that turn
Scheffer’s proposal from merely failing to strengthen genocide prevention to being
counterproductive. This section highlights a few examples of these implications of the
‘‘G-word.’’
As we saw above, several actors have, during the Darfur crisis, displayed a
revised—in Scheffer’s terminology, more ‘‘liberal’’—approach to the term ‘‘genocide.’’
This, however, should not create the impression that, in the future, more government
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statements and press releases will necessarily use the term. This has less to do with
uncertainty about whether the evidence meets the requirements of the UNCG than
with the inevitably political character of such a statement. While Scheffer advocates
distinguishing between legal and political uses of the term ‘‘genocide,’’ in international
political institutions such as the UN Security Council or the African Union (AU), few
will be able to appreciate the nuances of this approach—one need only think of the
state being accused of genocide, or of those traditionally keen on maintaining a
conservative reading of concepts such as sovereignty, including China, Russia, and
certain African states. In international politics, the ‘‘G-word’’ will remain a very
serious allegation to make against a foreign government—and this would likely be
equally true for any allegation that ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ are present on the
territory of a given state.14 This is something to consider, in particular, in a situation
in which those concerned with genocide prevention intend to ameliorate the situation
by sending UN peacekeepers to the country in question. Such deployment requires,
pursuant to chapter 6 of the UN Charter, consent by the relevant host state. Both
allegations of genocide and remarks pointing to ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ may render
this consent very unlikely.
The way the Darfur crisis has evolved serves as an example. It should be recalled
that the government of Sudan has, up to this point, opposed all efforts to replace the
understaffed and under-equipped AU contingents with a stronger UN force, calling
such attempts an effort to ‘‘recolonize’’ the Sudan.15 The UN Security Council’s
resolution of 31 August 2006, which outlines the replacement of the AU forces by
UN troops, does not mention either ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ or genocide—instead the
Security Council speaks of ‘‘its strong condemnation of all violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur.’’16 This is, on the one hand,
a concession to countries such as China and Russia, who might otherwise have vetoed
this resolution; but the omission of any reference to the term ‘‘genocide’’ is also
necessary to negotiating with the government of Sudan to try to gain its acceptance of
a UN mission to Darfur. The term ‘‘genocide,’’ following the US determination, led to a
UN commission of inquiry into the same question; since the commission’s report to the
United Nations that no genocidal policy could be documented, the ‘‘G-word’’ has played
no role on the international scene.17 All players, including the US government, have
subsequently referred only a few times to ‘‘genocide.’’ This may be decried as
inaccurate, or even shameful and dishonest; but as long as a humanitarian
intervention of the kind launched in Kosovo in the spring of 1999—circumventing
the UN Security Council and leaving aside the opposition of Russia, China,
and a number of African countries—remains an option discussed only in
editorials and letters to the editor, the ‘‘G-word’’ has only a minor role to play in the
international arena.
The use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ by different actors outside the United Nations
during the Darfur conflict has brought an additional issue to the forefront.
The independent determination of genocide by the US government in September
2004 made it evident that unilateral actions—regardless of their intentions—are easy
targets for political attacks, undermining the credibility and potential effect of any
such determination.18 The UNCG lacks a standing mechanism to survey violations of
the prohibition against genocide, but art. 8 reminds member states of the option
to turn to ‘‘relevant UN organs,’’ such as the Security Council, to take action.
Nowhere does the convention envisage that a member state might establish its
own commission to examine whether genocide is occurring in another member state.19
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In this case, both the Sudanese government and the Arab League denounced the
US finding as political propaganda.20 This will inevitably also be true of any future
unilateral assertions that ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ can be found in a given country; it is
much more difficult, however, to denounce the results of international fact-finding
commissions.21 Admittedly, the government speaking of ‘‘precursors of genocide’’
would not face the same burden of proof as the state declaring that genocide has
occurred; but this is also the soft spot of using the formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ as a
foreign-policy tool: the regime responsible for the situation in question can even more
easily refute the allegations as unfounded and pure political spin. Scheffer’s proposal,
intended to make genocide prevention more effective by lowering the threshold for
using relevant language, would in practice, in the case of a regime like the government
of Sudan, turn out to be self-defeating.

In the Interests of Preventing Genocide: Drop the ‘‘G-Word’’
Given the original focus of the UNCG on prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide, it is ironic that the term ‘‘genocide’’ has evolved to become a stumbling block
to genocide prevention. In the case of Darfur, much focus and energy was wasted, in
the first half of 2004, on discussing whether or not the conflict fell under the terms of
the UNCG. Politicians and the media engaged in intense debate over the ‘‘G-word,’’
while the victims of the violence continued to suffer and to wait for help.22 Scheffer’s
proposal would keep states locked in this futile debate with respect to future conflicts,
as the focus in the political reality will be not on ‘‘precursors’’—which could serve as an
important reminder of the fact that prevention can, and should, start long before the
actual mass violence is unleashed—but on ‘‘genocide.’’ It does not take much political
genius (at least, not after the endless discussions about the Darfur conflict) to predict
that future conflicts would yield similar debate over whether it is appropriate and
justified to speak of ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’
This debate is not only a waste of time when the situation demands quick, decisive
action to protect potential victims; it is also unnecessary, in light of recent
developments in the field of humanitarian intervention. According to the ‘‘Outcome
Document’’ of the UN World Summit of September 2005, which has since been
confirmed by a resolution in the UN Security Council, all states have a responsibility to
protect the civilian population of their own territory from war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, and, in cases where the state in question fails to act
as necessary, the international community has a responsibility to do the same.23 No
distinctions are made among these different crimes. The same is true for the provisions
of the UN Charter authorizing the Security Council to mandate peacekeeping missions
and of the Charter of the African Union, which explicitly allows the AU to intervene in
other member states when there are war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
genocide.24 For this reason, when considering external intervention necessary to stop a
situation from developing into genocide, genocide scholars and the media should drop
all focus on the ‘‘G-word,’’ rather than discussing whether certain actions could be
classified as ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’
Scheffer asserts that during the Kosovo conflict the then-current formulation
‘‘indicators of genocide’’ ended the media discussion of whether or not genocide was
occurring in Kosovo. Recall, however, that this discussion became moot because NATO
decided to intervene with force—and did so without the authorization of the UN
Security Council. The question of whether genocide was in the making became, for
some time, beside the point.25 It should be recalled also that the spring of 1999
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provided a case study of how easily the term ‘‘genocide’’ can be politically
instrumentalized within Western democracies. In Germany, for example, leading
members of the government spoke of genocide with a view to build public support for
the planned NATO operations.26 Scheffer’s call for ‘‘liberating governments from the
genocide factor’’ should also be weighed carefully in light of these recent experiences.

Interim Conclusion
Scheffer’s proposal to use the formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ must be rejected.
This rejection is not based on what the proposal tries to achieve; clearly it has its
academic merits and is based on good intentions. It fails to convince, however, in terms
of policy making, as it does not take into account the international response to the
Darfur crisis, and therefore it cannot help to make genocide prevention more effective.
The idea of distinguishing between legal, political, and historical applications of the
‘‘G-word’’ remains academic; instead we must realize that the ‘‘G-word,’’ in many cases,
will be a non-starter for effective genocide prevention. The ‘‘G-word’’ has an important
role to play when individual perpetrators are being brought to justice, but its role is far
more minor when it comes to generating international support for peacekeeping
operations or UN-authorized humanitarian interventions. It is Scheffer’s own concept
of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’—his second proposal—that implements this insight and points the
way toward accomplishing what really is at stake. Colin Powell put it this way in his
testimony before the US Senate:
Let us not be too preoccupied with this [genocide] designation. These people are in
desperate need and we must help them. Call it civil war; call it ethnic cleansing; call it
genocide; call it ‘‘none of the above.’’ The reality is the same. There are people in Darfur
who desperately need the help of the international community.27

‘‘Atrocity Law’’
After 1994, many genocide scholars and activists viewed the failure to label the mass
killings in Rwanda as genocide as symbolic of the failure to intervene and stop the
killings. More and more emphasis was placed on using the term ‘‘genocide,’’ and failure
to do so was branded ‘‘denial.’’ In 2004, the United States and other actors did call the
Sudanese government’s campaign in Darfur genocide—and those not using the
‘‘G-word’’ were attacked as deniers.28 But even after the US determination of genocide,
nothing much has happened on the ground. The situation of the people of Darfur
remains critical.
The lesson of Rwanda and Darfur—of the way the ‘‘G-word’’ was initially dodged,
only to be used later without serious or effective follow-up—is not that another time
around, witnessing yet another atrocious conflict, even more actors should label, or
should be urged to label, a given conflict ‘‘genocide.’’ The lesson, rather, is that the
genocide label can no longer be seen as a decisive step toward action to stop mass
killings. Labeling does not do it. Instead, a fresh look is needed. What terminology
should be used, by genocide scholars and others, when there are massive human-rights
violations and a quick and effective response is needed from the international
community? It is in this context, and taking into account the lengthy discussions about
genocide and the lack of response to Darfur, that we need to assess Scheffer’s second
proposal.
Here, Scheffer suggests placing genocide within a larger category of crimes that
also includes war crimes and crimes against humanity when these fulfill certain
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conditions, which he outlines in more detail. This category of crimes Scheffer calls
‘‘atrocity crimes.’’29 Scheffer remarks that the only answer to all questions on whether
or not a given conflict constitutes genocide should be, ‘‘We don’t care!’’30 Only this
second proposal, however—the notion of atrocity law—draws this consequence of the
issues surrounding the use of the ‘‘G-word’’; Scheffer’s suggestion to speak of
‘‘precursors of genocide’’ does not. For a number of reasons, Scheffer’s ‘‘atrocity
crimes’’ constitute a welcome addition to the terminology of genocide studies.
First of all, speaking of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may help to ensure that international
attention, be it from media or from scholars, is not overly focused on conflicts that
are being discussed as ‘‘genocide.’’ Because what is in a name? It is difficult to grasp
why the enormous war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has generated
so little interest, not to speak of response, in the mainstream media and among
non-governmental organizations in both North America and Europe. Several million
people are thought to have been killed in or because of the war in the DRC, while
the conflict in Darfur, over the last three years, has killed perhaps 400,000.
Indeed, suffering should not be measured in numbers; but neither should suffering
be measured in labels. This is as true for the DRC as for Darfur: international action
should not depend on a genocide determination.31 Scheffer’s notion of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
may help to overcome the existing focus on genocide.
Moreover, the concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may help to rid discussions in political
forums of the everlasting question of genocidal intent—and thus take the discussion
away from the lawyers.32 The UNCG stipulates a very high threshold for genocide:
that the perpetrator had the intent not only to carry out the acts described in the legal
definition of genocide but to do so with a view to destroy, in whole or in part, the group
to which the victims belong. The trials before the ICTY, in particular, have shown
what great challenges this requirement of intent can pose in terms of evidence—and
there is no need to confront policy makers with this discussion when they are deciding
on the feasibility of, for example, a military intervention. International law, as it
stands, allows for UN-authorized interventions and, arguably, for unauthorized
humanitarian interventions regardless of whether genocide or ‘‘only’’ ethnic cleansing
or other crimes against humanity are being committed. To speak of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ in
this connection helps to refocus the debate on the fact that widespread and systematic
human-rights violations are being committed. Their specific legal classification can
and should be left to judges and be dealt with outside the forums where political
measures to stop the crimes are discussed and decided.33 This should also be done to
ensure that the argument for intervention is not weakened by a debate over whether or
not a conflict is genocidal. Interestingly, the debate on whether or not genocide was
being committed in Darfur also died down after the UN Commission of Inquiry’s
statement that it could not determine an overall genocidal policy but recommended
that the International Criminal Court (ICC) examine this and other questions of
individual accountability more closely. After the UN Security Council referred the
Darfur situation to the ICC in March 2005, almost all international actors adopted
language indicating that the exact determination was up to the Court.34 This changed
the dynamics from, in a way, voting on the question of whether genocide was being
committed to acknowledging that this question was best placed with a tribunal.
Another reason to use the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is that it, better than the existing
terms, captures what is actually happening to the people on the ground. Dictionaries
define ‘‘atrocity’’ as a brutal or barbarous act, and thus the term ‘‘atrocity’’ appears
immediately meaningful also to the non-expert and non-lawyer.35 It also is free of any
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tendency to avoid naming crimes such as rapes and killings as the crimes they are;
this remains more questionable with terms used by some governments with respect
to Darfur, such as ‘‘humanitarian disaster’’—which remind one of natural disasters
rather than accurately describing the reality on the ground in Darfur. ‘‘Genocide’’
is an artificial word; it is not self-explanatory and is understood very differently not
only among experts but, in particular, among non-experts and the general public.
Some view the Holocaust as the only genocide; others speak of the killing of animals
for food production as genocide. The same lack of clarity exists among the general
public about the term ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’ It is not clear to everybody why the
killing of some tribes in a hitherto unknown province of Sudan should be considered
a crime against humanity, thus also affecting citizens of Europe or North America.
On this notion of humanity and its universal membership, Michael Ignatieff once made
a poignant observation when reciting a scene from Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah.
In this scene, a Polish peasant is asked what it meant for him that there was a
concentration camp bordering his fields. He answers, ‘‘When I cut my finger, I feel it.
When you cut your finger, you feel it.’’36 The term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ does not require us
to feel that we are part of some universal entity called ‘‘humanity’’; it does not require
that we all subscribe to some notion of liberal universalism. The term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
will not do away with all these issues, but it will add a sense of clarity.
To speak of genocide, some may interject, also sends a clear message. This may be
true in one way, but it also is important to note that labeling the situation in Darfur, or
any other situation, as ‘‘genocide’’ may be an oversimplification. Genocide is associated
with (and in some instances, such as the genocide definition of Frank Chalk and Kurt
Jonassohn, defined as) a form of one-sided killing.37 This is, of course, an accurate
description of the character of the crime of genocide and is important to remember.
Sometimes, however, genocide occurs against a background of armed conflict, and this
requires the observer to check carefully whether certain factions within the victim
group also commit crimes.38 To understand the current crisis in Darfur and to design a
solution to the underlying conflict, it is crucial to take note of the crimes committed by
some of the various and different Darfuri rebel groups.39 The term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
has the advantage of referring to human-rights violations in plural—leaving the door
open for a more nuanced picture of the conflict in question. When discussing the
deployment and mandate of a UN peacekeeping force, this may prove of crucial
importance.
In conclusion, Scheffer’s proposal is to be welcomed as a timely and needed
addition to the discourse on preventing and intervening in genocide. It will, of course,
take some time to make this term part of the common discourse in the media and
among decision makers, but genocide scholars and relevant non-governmental
organizations can influence this process.40 At one time ‘‘genocide,’’ too, was a
completely new creation; more recently, the concept of a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’
has made its way within a few years from a report commissioned by the Canadian
government into UN documents and diplomatic language. Genocide scholars should
begin disseminating the insight that ‘‘what matters is not the ‘‘G-word’’ but the
‘‘A-word’’—atrocity crimes.’’41

Looking Ahead: Genocide Prevention after Darfur
‘‘Just calling it genocide does not open a magic box—but it raises the moral and
political stakes. You can’t just say it’s genocide and then not get involved.’’42
This remark was made by Jerry Fowler, director of the Committee of Conscience
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at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the day before the US government made its
genocide determination. Most people thought that way back in September 2004—and
were proven wrong. The conflict in Darfur has been labeled a genocide, and nothing
much has happened since.
For the reasons outlined above, Scheffer’s notion of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ constitutes
a chance to move on from the shock of the Darfur determination and the subsequent
lack of action for those working on genocide prevention. ‘‘New conceptions require new
terms,’’ Lemkin wrote when introducing his own concept of genocide, and that is what
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ does.43 The concept challenges genocide scholars to question their
existing focus on deciding whether or not a conflict is genocide, as it compels them to
revisit some of the existing truths about genocide prevention. Clearly, less energy
should be put into fighting and denouncing ‘‘deniers’’ of the ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur and
elsewhere, when the main objective is to stop ongoing killings and to galvanize support
for an effective international response. A starting point for this work could be a closer
look at the mandate of UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Juan
Méndez:44 he is not to make genocide determinations. This is striking—and it makes
sense, not least because it gives the adviser a much broader mandate than to focus only
on actual cases of genocide.
In 2002, Samantha Power wrote on the value of the ‘‘G-word’’ that ‘‘still, Lemkin’s
coinage has done more good than harm.’’45 The question is whether this assessment
remains true after the tiring discussions regarding Darfur. In any case, it seems time
to limit the use of Lemkin’s concept of genocide to research and trials, while the
political work of prevention and intervention should make a fresh start—and it should
do so on the basis of the concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ as proposed by David Scheffer.
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As scholars and advocates, we are formidable taxonomists and explorers of
distinctions, ever probing new conceptual frontiers in the elusive quest to render an
overwhelming universe of human struggle more coherent and manageable.
The proliferation of terminology, however, the incantation of new strategic mantras,
while obviously relevant to the legal and political construction of the world, can often
become a self-contained exercise creating the mere illusion of progress. In some
circumstances, it can even divert precious resources away from the consolidation of
existing, and hard-won, norms and institutions. In considering the introduction of the
term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to the already complex lexicon of humanitarian discourse,
we need to take account of its relative weight in terms of the most important
challenges confronting the prevention of genocide. In particular, we need to ask
whether the cost–benefit calculus of promoting this new concept and purported
discipline justifies a significant commitment of energy and resources, whether
intellectual or political, that might otherwise be focused on strengthening established
concepts and disciplines that may be adequate but still at the margins of political
consciousness. While I have the utmost respect and admiration for David Scheffer’s
unique contributions to the prevention and punishment of genocide and crimes against
humanity, I have misgivings about the relative weight and importance that he assigns
to ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ as a useful instrument for promoting this cause.
The argument that the loaded term ‘‘genocide’’ intimidates states from responding
effectively must be assessed against the fact that alternative categorizations have only
marginal impact on meaningful action where there is a failure of political will. Are we
to conclude, for instance, that US willingness to characterize the Darfur situation as
‘‘genocide’’ resulted in a more robust response compared to Rwanda, where there was
reluctance to use this term? Or, conversely, that if the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ had been
used in an early-warning context, there would have been greater preventive
engagement on the part of the United Nations prior to escalation into genocidal
violence? Furthermore, the newly established mandate of the UN special adviser on
the prevention of genocide clearly indicates that a prior legal determination that acts
constitute genocide or crimes of comparable gravity is not required for preventive
action. With the gradual mainstreaming of this mandate in the UN system, it is
increasingly understood that there is a distinction between ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘prevention
of genocide.’’ In any event, to the extent that conceptual categorization has an
appreciable impact in a preventive context, there is evidence that the elevated status
of genocide or crimes of comparable gravity has justified prioritization of certain
situations amidst the multitude of issues clamoring for global attention. A safer,
more diluted concept such as ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may actually undermine such
privileged treatment. Even assuming that a less intimidating concept is required,
Payam Akhavan, ‘‘Proliferation of Terminology and the Illusion of Progress.’’ Genocide Studies
and Prevention 2, 1 (April 2007): 73–80. ß 2007 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
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there is no compelling reason not to use well-established and easily recognized terms
such as ‘‘gross’’ or ‘‘large-scale’’ human-rights violations, which are standards applied
in different contexts for prioritizing international scrutiny of certain situations by
UN bodies. If anything, restricting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to the elementary category of war
crimes while not including the broader category of human-rights violations falsely
and dangerously assumes that abuses in situations not amounting to a state of war
or armed conflict do not have the potential to culminate in genocide. It is also doubtful
that a new concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would somehow focus the attention of the wider
public and thereby mobilize opinion and encourage action. It is safe to assume that
public calls for action are primarily the result of shocking contextualized images
of suffering conveyed by the media, or the intimate accounts of survivors, and not
of abstract legal categorization of situations. The bottom line is that what we need
most is not a conceptual or rhetorical magic bullet but, rather, a greater focus on
integrating and mainstreaming existing concepts and institutions into the daily habits
and rituals of decision-makers, with a view to transforming an entrenched culture
of reaction into a culture of prevention.
In certain respects, the preoccupation with preventive terminology emerged most
forcefully in the crucible of Rwanda. It is well-known in genocide-studies circles that in
1994, during the extermination campaign against Tutsis, officials in the Clinton
administration were instructed ‘‘not to describe the deaths as genocide, even though
some senior officials believe that is exactly what they represent.’’1 There are some
suggestions that this reluctance was based on the view that characterizing the killings
as ‘‘genocide’’ would trigger application of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and the corresponding obligation
under art. 1, whereby states parties ‘‘undertake to prevent and to punish’’ the crime
of genocide.2 To the extent that denial of the term ‘‘genocide’’ was actuated by such
a view, it is based on a false premise. In the Application of the Genocide Convention
Case, the eminent judge ad hoc appointed by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sir Elihu
Lauterpacht, considered whether the duty to prevent under art. 1 ‘‘extends beyond
the duty of each party to prevent genocide within its own territory to that of preventing
genocide wherever it may occur.’’3 He surveyed contemporary incidents of genocide
and concluded that ‘‘the limited reaction of the parties to the Genocide Convention
in relation to these episodes may represent a practice suggesting the permissibility
of inactivity.’’4 It is more significant that US officials were willing to admit that ‘‘acts
of genocide may have occurred,’’ because a label as stark as ‘‘genocide’’ would ‘‘inflame
public calls for action the Administration is unwilling to take.’’5 In other words, it was
the mere rhetorical force of genocide, its perception as the pinnacle of evil, that
rendered its use controversial, rather than any particular legal consequences flowing
therefrom. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher deflated the rhetorical
onslaught of human-rights advocates by remarking dismissively that ‘‘if there’s any
particular magic in calling it a genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that.’’6 During
his visit to Kigali on 25 March 1998, a somewhat contrite President Bill Clinton said
that the international community ‘‘bear[s] its share of responsibility for this
tragedy . . . . We did not act quickly enough after the killing began . . . we did not
immediately call these crimes by their rightful name, genocide.’’7
A decade later, with the unfolding of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ in the Darfur region of
Sudan, and conscious of the legacy of catastrophic moral failure in relation to Rwanda,
US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that, based on evidence of ‘‘a consistent and widespread pattern of
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atrocities,’’ he had concluded ‘‘that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the
Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit [sic] bear responsibility—and that genocide
may still be occurring.’’8 By October 2005, moreover, the UN World Summit ‘‘Outcome
Document,’’9 representing the largest-ever gathering of heads of state and government,
had recognized the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ populations, not only against genocide but
also against war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.10 Despite the
recognition of a collective responsibility on the part of the international community to
intervene against genocide, and the willingness of the US government, at least, to
characterize the situation as genocide, it is difficult to conclude that the international
community’s response to massive crimes in Darfur was significantly better than its
response to events in Rwanda. Likewise, had the less offensive term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
been deployed in a preventive capacity, it is doubtful that more effective action would be
forthcoming. The impediment to an effective response was overwhelmingly a failure of
political will, as in Rwanda a decade earlier, and the particular terminology adopted
would have had a marginal impact at best. Use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ was hardly a
‘‘brake’’ on an effective response, because there was no effective response forthcoming
in any event. It is in this light that we should assess the misguided exercise by
the Security Council of establishing a commission of inquiry focused on whether or not
the slaughter fulfilled the legal definition of genocide. The obvious issue simply was the
prevention of genocide (or a similar crime of vast scale), not whether or not genocide had
occurred. In this context, the commission’s legal deliberations represented willful
blindness on the part of the Security Council to the imperative of prevention. Against
the backdrop of what was happening at the time, this legal hairsplitting was largely
a pretense of useful activity, and the debate over the application of particular
hierarchical abstractions a pretext for prolonging the ultimate decision not to take
robust action against Sudan, not to protect the civilian population against subjection
to obvious and outrageous horrors not in need of labeling. Had Secretary Powell
insisted that ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ were being committed in Darfur, or had he perhaps
claimed that ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ were being committed, there is little reason to
believe that the reaction would have been any different. Surely, the urgency of acting in
a preventive capacity against an enormous human catastrophe was not conceptually
difficult for Security Council members to appreciate.
Perhaps the most significant development during the post-Rwanda period, a
development with subtle but potentially far-reaching implications for transforming the
capacity of the UN to act more effectively, is the recent establishment of a mandate on
the prevention of genocide. On 12 July 2004, acting pursuant to art. 99 of the UN
Charter and Security Council resolution 1366 of 2001, the secretary-general informed
the Security Council of the appointment of Juan E. Méndez to serve as his special
adviser on the prevention of genocide.11 The outline of the mandate, attached to a
letter of the same date to the Security Council, provides in relevant part that the
special adviser will
(a) collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on
massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of
ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (b) act as
a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security
Council, by bringing to their attention potential situations that could result in genocide;
(c) make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on
actions to prevent or halt genocide; (d) liaise with the United Nations system on
activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations
capacity to analyse and manage information relating to genocide or related crimes.
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It is significant that this mandate is not much concerned with the definition of
genocide. The terms of reference specifically indicate that ‘‘The Special Adviser would
not make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Convention
had occurred. The purpose of his activities, rather, would be practical and intended
to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.’’12 A report on the work of
the Office of the Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide13 that I submitted
on 7 November 2005, at the request of M. Mendez, reflects the views of a broad
cross-section of actors within the UN system, including UN officials, member states,
experts, and NGOs, on the prevention of genocide. These perspectives are particularly
instructive for the present discussion on the strategic value of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
as a single term that could help focus attention on prevention, at least within the
UN system. The first observation is that the mandate relates to ‘‘genocide or related
crimes’’ and is deliberately not restricted to a particular legal definition. The second
is that ‘‘because the mandate of the Special Adviser is the prevention of genocide,
it cannot be limited to situations that actually constitute genocide under the definition
of that term in international law.’’14
With respect to the first point,
almost all respondents agreed that the Special Adviser’s mandate should include any
situation where identifiable groups were at risk of mass-killing or other forms of
destruction. It was pointed out that the Secretary-General’s speech before the 2004
session of the Human Rights Commission described the mandate as including ‘‘not only
genocide but also [. . .] mass murder and other large-scale human rights violations, such
as ethnic cleansing.’’ This understanding is confirmed by the 2005 World Summit
Outcome document which, in connection with the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ populations
from ‘‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,’’ endorsed
the mandate of the Special Adviser. Several respondents pointed out that it would be
inconceivable to exclude situations like the mass killing of political and social groups by
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia from the scope of the mandate. It was observed that in
practice, it should be the quality and intention behind a potential attack against an
identifiable group that guides the mandate rather than strict legal definitions. It was
also remarked however, that an unduly broad interpretation of the type of situations
that are relevant would dilute the narrow focus of the mandate and consequently, its
added value within the United Nations system.15

Thus, there is a prevailing understanding within the UN system that the category of
situations this mandate is intended to prevent includes atrocities broader than
the crime of genocide, but that it should not be inordinately diluted either, since that
would risk trivialization of the mandate, ultimately compromising its effectiveness as
a focal point for action.
With respect to the second point, the report notes that
There is a conception of the Special Adviser’s mandate that confuses prevention of
genocide with intervention against genocide, and which thus looks to the Holocaust,
Rwanda, or the Darfur, as the archetypal genocidal situations warranting the Special
Adviser’s attention. Early warning and prevention should not be understood in such an
unduly narrow or stark sense. On some occasions, the Special Adviser’s informal
expressions of interest in a particular situation have been viewed with scepticism
within the United Nations Secretariat on the basis that a conflict was merely political
and did not contain an ethnic element, or that his assessment was alarmist and
unnecessary. There is a need to defer to the Special Adviser’s judgement in such
situations since the potential for genocide may not always be apparent from a conflict
prevention, human rights, or other perspectives.16
76

Proliferation of Terminology and the Illusion of Progress

This addresses the most important and most misunderstood aspect of this mandate,
and genocide prevention more generally—namely, that
the role of the Special Adviser should not be equated with an ‘‘alarm bell’’ warning
of imminent genocide or mass murder. Early warning requires interaction and
engagement within the United Nations system in order to improve the prospect of
warnings leading to appropriate action in a timely fashion. For instance, instead of a
public announcement of imminent atrocities, the Special Adviser could, at the early
stages of a situation with genocidal potential, discretely inform the Security Council
through the Secretary-General and propose the involvement of relevant actors such as
donor States, international financial institutions, or non-governmental organizations.
In other situations, the Special Adviser could make a discrete proposal to establish a
fact-finding mission or initiate a good offices procedure. Such behind-the-scenes
involvement, without any public reference to the mandate of preventing genocide, may
ease the prospect of constructive engagement with the relevant government, where
such an option exists. Early warning that leads to effective action must be seen as an
organic process rather than a disjointed last-minute whistle-blowing exercise.17

If there is an urgent objective, it is the mainstreaming of this conception of prevention
into an otherwise reactive culture within the UN system. Engagement of relevant
actors is less a function of emphasizing the ‘‘genocide’’ label than of the daily habits
and interactions within the decision-making process. As to the use of the term
‘‘genocide,’’ my report once again is instructive in terms of the views of actors within
the UN system:
A related issue, reinforcing the need for discrete networks of collaboration within the
United Nations system, is the apparent stigma attached to the Special Adviser’s
mandate. There is a widespread perception that his interest or involvement in a given
situation is an implicit indictment of a Government for the crime of genocide. . . . Such
views disregard the express stipulation in the Special Adviser’s mandate that he ‘‘not
make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the [1948 Genocide]
Convention ha[s] occurred.’’. . . Even supportive Member States view the title of the
mandate as a liability given the unique stigma attached to the term ‘‘genocide.’’
However, no convincing alternatives to the title have been proposed and some
respondents have pointed out that it is both a liability and an asset, since the term
‘‘genocide’’ also imbues the Special Adviser with moral authority. Such considerations
also point to an insufficient recognition of the discreet role that the Special Adviser can
play in such situations without necessarily alerting Governments or the public to his
direct involvement.18

Thus, in an early-warning context, the label of genocide is not so important, because
the most effective response may typically be discreet engagement of influential actors
rather than rallying public opinion. If circumstances are such that a more open and
confrontational posture is required, then the genocide label may actually be an
essential rhetorical weapon in galvanizing public opinion and calling for urgent
attention to a particular situation. Again, however, it is doubtful whether introducing
the new term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ will make an appreciable difference rather than sowing
more confusion by introducing new terminology into a decision-making context where
it is a real struggle to integrate even established concepts in policy discourse.
Even if, in certain circumstances, there is a compelling need for a term that
captures the early stages of a potentially genocidal situation, the mandate of the
special adviser speaks to it in terms of ‘‘large-scale human rights violations,’’ which, in
effect, closely resembles the somewhat stricter concept of crimes against humanity.
This is an important distinction from the concept of war crimes, which applies only to
77

Genocide Studies and Prevention 2:1 April 2007

situations of armed conflict. War crimes, such as murder, torture, and rape, may be
isolated or random acts; they are virtually identical with serious human-rights
violations, except that in a state of armed conflict killing and injuring combatants is
permissible. Thus, the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, as a peacetime
human-rights standard, is more exacting than the lex specialis of international
humanitarian law, which permits exceptions. Killings in peacetime would appear to be
even more ominous than similar acts during an armed conflict, given the absolute
protection of the right to life in such circumstances. In this respect, it is noteworthy
that the contemporary definition of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ in international law
does not require a nexus with armed conflict, such that this broad category applies in
peacetime as well. Although ‘‘large-scale human rights violations’’ can be substantially
assimilated to this category in the broad context of humanitarian or policy discourse,
crimes against humanity incorporate a legal requirement of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, which may also become a pretext for
futile or obstructive legal debate rather than effective preventive action.19 Perhaps
this is why the secretary-general’s definition of the mandate is deliberately broad and
flexible in including the term ‘‘large-scale human rights violations.’’ Thus, even if it
were assumed that ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is a useful label for prompting preventive action
when a situation leading to potential genocide is still dormant, the concept should
comprise not only war crimes but also large-scale violations of human rights.
If anything, the worst genocides could occur in situations where one side is not in
a position to offer military resistance, where there is no armed conflict but simply
one-sided massacres, or where, at least, human-rights violations that are significant
and ominous in a particular context, but not legally qualified as widespread
or systematic, could quickly explode into large-scale violence. In Rwanda, large-scale
though still limited human-rights violations—isolated massacres, for instance—and
not war crimes preceded the onset of the genocide of April 1994; in Darfur,
a low-intensity armed conflict with relatively few war crimes rapidly escalated to
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and genocide. So restricting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ by not including
violations of human rights is a potentially serious oversight. In any event, why
reinvent the wheel when existing concepts are more than adequate? Even assuming
that a less intimidating concept than ‘‘prevention of genocide’’ is required, there is
no compelling reason not to use the well-established and easily recognized term ‘‘largescale human rights violations,’’ as indicated in the UN mandate, or, alternatively, the
similar term ‘‘gross’’ human rights violations, which was stipulated in UN Economic
and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) (1970) as the standard for situations
requiring consideration by the UN Human Rights Commission. Why spend considerable time and effort to familiarize the UN system with a new concept, or to lobby for
adoption of the standard in a resolution or internal guideline, when there is already a
pressing need to internalize existing concepts? This is particularly so because the
existing concepts are more than adequate for all the purposes that the proposed
category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is intended to serve.
It is also doubtful that the new term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would somehow focus
the attention of the wider public. ‘‘Prevention of genocide’’ more clearly explains, in
non-specialist terms, the reality of taking action in order to prevent something
approximating mass killings or collective destruction. The term ‘‘prevention of atrocity
crimes’’ would be inaccurate and misleading, since the only relevance in this context is
that such crimes are a precursor to genocide or similar crimes. What we are really
trying to say is that we should deal with ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ because they may lead to
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a much more serious crime, such as genocide. The phrase ‘‘prevention of genocide’’
more readily captures this concept among the uninitiated public. If any education
is required, it is in the concept of ‘‘prevention’’ rather than that of ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
Ultimately, such atrocities are worthy of heightened attention because of the
potential for genocide, and not all ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ necessarily imply escalation into
mass killings or other forms of collective destruction that justify privileged treatment
of such contexts.
We should also consider whether placing our faith in abstractions as a means
of stimulating the will to act, especially among the wider public, overlooks the vital role
of emotional connection with the stark horror of such situations, where rational
normative schemes are certainly not at the forefront of people’s minds. When we look
at bodies littering the hills of Rwanda or the Darfur, is it the schematic labeling that
arouses indignation and empathy, or the intimate face of suffering? Is our inordinate
faith in intellectual concepts and terms not a privileging of distance over intimacy,
a case of inadvertently placing abstractions over engagement? Is the more powerful
form of cognition, in this context, not emotional rather than rational? Is it not the
unspeakability of such evil, the ineffability of intense human suffering, that speaks
most loudly to our conscience? The voices of survivors, the cruel reality of hatred
and violence, are more potent than any term that we could devise in our rarefied midst
as scholars and advocates.
When the UNCG was adopted on 9 December 1948, the president of the
UN General Assembly triumphantly declared that ‘‘the supremacy of international
law had been proclaimed and a significant advance had been made in the development
of international criminal law.’’20 The less euphoric prognosis of Sir Hartley
Shawcross—the eminent British prosecutor at Nuremberg—was that, ‘‘while making
no significant contribution to international law, the convention might . . . delude people
into thinking that some great step forward had been taken whereas in reality nothing
at all had been changed.’’21 In retrospect, the culture of impunity that has prevailed
for much of the UN era, and the continuing failure to intervene against genocide in
places such as Rwanda and Darfur, gives some credence to Sir Hartley’s skepticism
about inordinate emphasis on legal definitions and proliferation of terminology.
In considering whether ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would make a substantial contribution
to contemporary challenges, we should consider his admonition about creating
the illusion of progress, and ponder whether our efforts would not be better placed
in consolidating existing norms and concepts, painstakingly won and still at the
margins of power.
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David Scheffer’s ‘‘Genocide and Atrocity
Crimes’’: A Response
Mark Levene
University of Southampton, UK

I have to be honest: it was with some degree of reluctance that I agreed to GSP’s
invitation to offer a commentary on David Scheffer’s paper. Not only has my
involvement in genocide studies been explicitly on the academic, rather than hands-on
activist or, for that matter, legal side, but also I have made abundantly clear in recent
years that I do not find a real basis for genocide prevention either in Lemkinesque
assumptions as to the development of strengthened juridical instruments aimed at
buttressing existing international law or in military intervention against violators.1
Genocide, in my view, has always been, to greater or lesser degrees, far too inextricably
bound up with the conflicts and tensions of the broader international political economy
ever to be isolatable to the circumstances—however singular—of any specific state.
Nor do I believe it to be a phenomenon wholly treatable—and hence curable—in its
own right, without respect, that is, to a wider and more holistic epidemiology of
violence in the modern world. This is not to say that I consider that genocide can
simply be subsumed within wider categories of violence; indeed, one of the most
peculiar, if not bewildering, aspects of the phenomenon is the degree to which it defies
most conventional, including social-scientific, analyses as to its origins and nature.2
Even standard notions that genocide involves a straightforward bipolarity between
one group of actors carrying out the violence and a second group who are its
defenseless victims, while it may have salience on some occasions, I find increasingly
wanting, on a variety of levels, with reference to many of the contemporary instances
referred to as ‘‘genocide’’ today. Prevention of genocide, if we are to arrive there at all,
thus requires, in my reckoning, not only a much broader engagement with the
systemic sources of conflict in the contemporary world but a paradigmatic shift in our
approach to the fundaments of human life on this planet.
This view, then, is not only at critical variance with much of the guiding spirit of
GSP but must inevitably lead to something bordering on outrage from many of its
readers, who passionately believe that something must and can be done in the face
of the most gross human-rights violations of our era. Darfur is very much at this time
on the lips and in the minds of genocide activists and academics alike, as touchstone to
this aspiration. The need for action, they argue, is as urgent now as it was over
Rwanda a dozen years ago. As a matter of fact, I cannot but share the intensity of this
feeling, not least when confronted with the ongoing procrastination, not to say faintheartedness, of that thing we call the ‘‘international community.’’ But what exactly is
going to be the most efficacious route by which to deal with this particular affliction,
not just now but later, and with all those other cases of mass atrocity that—whether
correctly or incorrectly termed genocides—are likely to arise in the foreseeable future?
At least my initial reluctance to engage with Scheffer stemmed from one wholly
erroneous assumption. I assumed that, given his background, Scheffer’s propositions
would take us further into the realms of high-minded legal abstractions without much
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reference to practical implementation. On this score I was entirely wrong. In fact,
a great deal of what he has to say is about bridging the gap between the legal and
political arenas. On the one hand, his two propositions attempt to cut through a great
deal of the tortuous sophistry that seems to notably encumber this terrain—and,
indeed, to act as an inertial brake on action. On the other, they represent cogent,
persuasive, even radical arguments for how a legally informed revision of current
understandings of state-led mass violence might be translated into international
political action on behalf of those communities that are its victims. I should add that
I find Scheffer’s formulations—in their own terms—perfectly logical and internally
consistent.
However, this fails to assuage some of my fundamental disagreements with his
operating premises. My engagement, thus, is as follows. I deal with his propositions
only in so far as he develops the broad sweep of his argument, finding myself neither
able nor competent to comment on the recent ICC or ad hoc tribunal judgments
on genocide to which he particularly addresses himself in the last section of his piece.
All I wish to state, so far as this aspect of the argument is concerned, is that the way
international lawyers seem to be interpreting the meaning of ‘‘genocide’’ in a more
elastic way than previously, and the degree to which this would seem to lead to their
being less bound by some of the more inflexible and overtly legalistic tendencies within
the original UNCG formulations, can only be welcomed as salutary.
Having then put to one side what I am not dealing with, my response will closely
mirror the two primary issues of Scheffer’s own explication. In the first instance, I wish
to consider the degree to which his proposition—in effect, that attempting to move
several steps back in the genocidal process presents a helpful way of ‘‘getting one’s
retaliation in first,’’ to the challenge of possible genocide—and, indeed, whether what
he considers the relevant ‘‘precursors’’ to genocide are adequate for making a judgment
that genocide is, in some shape or form, foreseeable. In the second instance, while
I make clear from the outset my assent to his case for a broader codification of various
forms of extreme violence, including genocide, under a broader atrocity rubric, I briefly
comment on what meaning and salience this has for the international politics of the
early twenty-first century. Finally, as will be evident in part throughout this critique,
I restate what I think is the actual likely course of mass violence against non-state
communal populations in the contemporary world and the paradoxical issues this must
raise for the West—more specifically, the United States—in response to this violence.
This, I posit, is fundamental to the issues that are at stake in Scheffer’s argument,
given that, when he talks about the response of the international community
to genocide and atrocity more generally, what he really means is the response of the
hegemonic elements in this community.

Genocide and the Issue of ‘‘Precursors’’
‘‘There is a critical need to liberate governments and international organizations from
the genocide factor.’’3 This is an extraordinarily arresting statement at the very outset
of this piece. Even more arresting, arguably, is this later assertion: ‘‘What becomes
important is the action being taken to prevent genocide rather than the search for
the crime of genocide.’’4 Scheffer’s argument, in a nutshell, revolves around how the
repeated logjam of international inaction in the face of genocide, or what appears to
be genocide, can be broken. Or, to put it another way, how can legal instruments be
reformulated in order both to enable political actors to act and to legitimate their
actions before genocide explodes in the international community’s face.
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Thus, Scheffer’s argument represents a direct response to the repeated plaint of
all those who hold the notion of prevention dear and who have been increasingly
frustrated and disenchanted, year on year, decade on decade, by the yawning gap
between the ostensible terms of the UNCG, on the one hand, and the complete absence
of UN-mandated prevention, on the other. Having listed a series of cases, throughout
the 1990s and into the present century, in which he sees genocide as having occurred,
and during which the international community mostly sat on its hands—culminating
in Darfur—Scheffer argues that the solution does not lie in the strengthening
of juridical instruments per se; that is, in a trajectory whose effort and aim is to
prove that genocide has occurred, when it has occurred. This would be a classic case,
anyway, of an ‘‘after the horse has bolted’’ response. Rather, Scheffer proposes a
different, more thoroughly prevention-centered strategy in which the key is the
foregrounding of the indicators of genocide at a high political level, presumably with
the assistance of the international legal community, only so that these recognized
indicators (or precursors) of genocide might provide the necessary justification and
legitimization for the United States, the United Nations, or other leading elements
within the international community to act against the perceived malefactor and to stop
the crime before it occurs. In place of malice aforethought, thus, the international
community is legitimated to intervene to disarm malice aforethought.
To develop this argument, Scheffer takes us more closely through the events
leading up to the US-led NATO intervention in Kosovo in the spring of 1999—in
which he was, clearly, intimately involved—in which evidence of precursors is
identified and the relevant high-level bodies briefed and thus positioned to take the
necessary on-the-hoof decisions both to parry and to prevent the Serbs’ anti-Albanian
action. Here, presumably, Scheffer takes Kosovo as a textbook example—albeit not an
absolutely perfect one—of what can be achieved in crisis conditions. In this instance,
military force was brought to bear to stop Slobodan Milosevic’s intended plan of
extermination and, in the process, to bring the threat of genocide to Kosovar
Albanians, implicit in Serb domination, to an end.
Putting aside, however, whether we can determine with hindsight that Milosevic
did indeed have a plan of genocide, and that this would have been carried out had it
not been for the forceful NATO response, I find Scheffer’s very formulation of
what constitutes the warning signs of a forthcoming act of mass murder most
significant in terms of what he omits to state. Thus, for Scheffer, the relevant
indicators, or precursors, of genocide in Kosovo have a very short fuse, beginning only
in 1998, when the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries began murderous assaults on
a number of Kosovar-Albanian communities; these attacks were ratcheted up into
the spring of 1999 to such a degree that all the intelligence and other data presented to
the US executive, among others, pointed to the extreme urgency of a response.
This explication is neat but, unfortunately, avoids the degree to which the Kosovo
crisis was both chronologically much deeper and embedded not only in the domestic
Yugoslav problem (going back a mere 120 years) but, equally, in repeated systemic
failures of European and other parties—including the United States—to respond to it
not only much earlier but in an entirely more coherent fashion geared toward avoiding
mass violence in the first place. Is Scheffer, for instance, being willfully amnesiac
when he fails to mention that the potential for such violence went back at least to
1989 and that, while the pan-Yugoslav crisis that was a direct consequence of the
Kosovar-Serb confrontation then shifted to more obviously bloody domains elsewhere
in the federation, the potential for violence in Kosovo itself hardly dissipated?
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The fact that this potentiality was held in check, we may be reminded, had much to
do with the extraordinary, but almost entirely unsung, efforts of Ibrahim Rugova,
the Kosovar Albanian leader whose Gandhian non-violence should have been amply
rewarded at the internationally determined Dayton Accords in December 1995, where
instead he was cold-shouldered, not to say utterly marginalized, in favor of plaudits
and prestige for none other than the likes of Milosevic himself!
Now if Scheffer were to retort, ‘‘I agree, but how long is a piece of string? We have
to begin somewhere for immediate precursors,’’ my response in turn would be, ‘‘Yes,
agreed, but that must surely be here in 1995, and, may I humbly add, with the full
facts before us.’’ With Rugova’s position cut from under his feet by the wise counsels of
the US, British, and other members of the Contact Group (alas, whatever the
realpolitik going on here, we do not have space for it in this brief outing), the
immediate countdown to disaster begins at this juncture, not in 1998. And why? Not so
much because of the behavior of Milosevic, sated by his Dayton ‘‘victory,’’ but, rather,
because of the appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—a previously
unknown group of utterly thuggish ‘‘freedom-fighters’’ (though in today’s lexicon
‘‘terrorists’’ would be a much more suitable epiphet)—who seemed to spring into
life out of the blue but who, we now firmly and unequivocally know, were aided
and abetted by none other than the CIA, not least through assisting their narcotics
trade, and with the explicit purpose of building up military potential and thus creating
enough instability in Kosovo to provoke Belgrade into a reaction.5 Which, of course,
it did. Now, please forgive me if I appear to be suggesting that Milosevic, in this affair,
was some sort of innocent party on the side of the angels. I am doing nothing of the
sort. His entourage were utterly criminal—indeed, of a very similar frame of mind
and propensity to violence to that of the younger Hashim Thaci on the KLA side,
the only difference being that the latter now had the most powerful state in the world
on side, as was clearly enunciated at the 1999 Rambouillet Accords, no less, when
Madeleine Albright was able to engineer demands utterly resonant of what the
Austrians, post-Sarajevo, presented to Serbia in 1914, with the aim of receiving either
its capitulation as a state or resort to war.6
Now, readers may still feel exasperated by what I am doing here, not least because
we know that, after Rambouillet, hundreds of thousands of Albanians were ejected
from their homes, at gunpoint, in the spring of 1999 and then forced into frantic,
terrified flight to the Macedonian and Albanian borders. The point that needs to
be stressed, however, is that precursors to potential genocide are rarely so
one-dimensional as Scheffer would seem to propose; they involve a dynamic, however
asymmetric, between one or more parties, heavily exacerbated, of course, if both
behave in an armed, violent, and ruthless manner (and regardless of the consequences
for the communities who might otherwise be bystanders). Moreover, they are
exacerbated further by critical omissions, or commissions, from elements of the
‘‘international community’’ that fuel rather than dampen the potential for conflict.
This is not to suggest that the ‘‘international community’’ should do nothing. Indeed,
what I have implicitly proposed, with respect to Kosovo, is that the alert to the danger
signals should have come far earlier, and with a view to bolstering the indigenous
peace parties evident in both Pristina and Belgrade. Instead, what is particularly
egregious about this particular affair—the outcome of which Scheffer seems to think
so highly of—is the degree to which its actually far from peaceful outcome involved
the covert meddling and, ultimately, the diktat of leading international players, who
were as complicit and responsible as either Milosevic or Thaci.
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It seems to me thus, despite Scheffer’s protestations to the contrary,7 that his
tunnel-visioned view of ‘‘precursors’’ is ultimately meant to legitimize a single course of
action: recourse to military—more specifically US, US-led, or US-sponsored—
intervention against identified states. And this by willfully disregarding a different,
broader understanding of what constitutes precursors, a holistic analysis of which
might lead to a much more meaningful and non-hegemonic basis for the genuine
prevention of mass violence. I do not particularly want to belabor the point, but the
case is, arguably, even more poignantly and tragically made by reference to Darfur.
This, of course, was the subject of GSP’s entire first issue, in which, like Scheffer,
three of the five contributors expended much energy expounding on the failure of the
‘‘international community’’ to intervene forcefully against the government of Sudan
(GoS); one of these contributors went so far as to imagine an ‘‘international’’ assault
that would, if necessary, ‘‘stand down’’ (I read that as ‘‘wipe out’’) its entire army.8
Significantly, in Scheffer’s piece, precursors are again presented as very recent events,
in this case appearing, he argues, in early 2003—by implication, in the form of GoS and
Janjaweed assaults on the peoples of Darfur, although the perpetrators are
not mentioned by name; by the same token, he gives us no indication that the conflict
at this point was actually precipitated by the insurgent Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA) surprise attack on El Fasher.
Let us, however, by way of counterpoint, be reminded of the most perspicacious
contributions in GPS 1:1, namely those by Scott Straus and, especially, by René
Lemarchand.9 Both have the advantage, unlike the other contributions, of being
written by genuine area experts, as borne out in analyses of Darfurian events
that show us much of their true complexity. Again we are presented with chronologies
that go back to at least the 1970s or 1980s and with dynamics of conflict involving
both domestic and regional actors, including interactions with insurgencies in the
southern part of Sudan, major efforts at destabilization by Habré’s Chad (and,
in return, by the GoS against Chad), and for a while, even more notably, Gaddafi’s
Libya (now, of course, in the ranks of the most noble of noble allies of the West),
in which some Darfurians were prepared to act as proxies to one or other of these
several parties. Significantly, too, again not unlike the case of Kosovo by reference to
Dayton, or, for that matter, Rwanda by way of Arusha, the internationally sponsored
Navaisha power-sharing accords between Khartoum and the southern rebels left out
in the cold a critical set of players, in this case those Darfurian elites who were seeking
their own slice of regional autonomy. Precursors of genocide, however one organizes
them in a matrix, seem to have components that arise with some frequency.
But there remains a problem even with this exposition. It all would seem to come
down to politics, the obvious solution being that, if we could only get our social-science
methodologies of these conflicts more finely tuned, we could then offer sounder policy
recommendations on what to do about them. The problem with Darfur is that the
underlying causes of conflict are very much more environmentally driven than that;
the most consequential of these, as Lemarchand points out, has been the steady
advance of desertification in this part of the Sahel, an early sign of which was the
catastrophic famine of the mid-1980s.10
Here, then, we arrive at the fundamental dispute I have with Scheffer over the
issue of precursors. Do we want to understand these indicators in terms of deep,
systemic factors that—as in the case of Sahelian desertification—are driven by
a variety of regional, but increasingly global, factors, above all anthropogenic climate
change, which, of course, would demand of us an entirely more far-reaching project
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for saving the people of the Sahel (and the planet entire)? Or do we only want to see
precursors in a way that allows us—the West, the international community, whatever
you want to call it—to deal simply with the most immediate effects, thereby, of course,
putting to one side the deeper-set, and much more endemic, issues at stake?
In GPS 1:1, Samuel Totten’s ire was particularly inflamed by a comment from
Alex de Waal (in his own right a leading African rights specialist) proposing that the
US determination, in September 2004, that atrocities in Darfur amounted to genocide
was evidence of a ‘‘salvation fairy tale, with the US playing the role of saviour.’’11
Though I am hardly as eloquent as de Waal, my own notes on Scheffer’s argument
include the jotting, ‘‘magic bullet?’’ What, above all, I read from his ‘‘precursors’’
formula is a method to expedite the arrival of the Seventh Cavalry: no history, no real
engagement with why such and such country became destabilized in the first place, let
alone recognition of the degree to which we ourselves have been complicit in the
process. Just a neat and straightforward ‘‘stand down’’ of the bad guys.
Am I being obtuse for the sake of it? Well, consider other places where ‘‘Western’’
military intervention, for other reasons, is ongoing at the present time. Are current
events in Iraq, or in Afghanistan, evidence that we are sorting these ‘‘God-forsaken’’
places out, or actually that we are driving them even further over the precipice? Or, to
take a different example, did the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) ‘‘liberation’’
of Rwanda from the grips of Hutu Power really bring mass atrocity to an end, or did
it simply export the violence to neighboring eastern Congo (presumably what Scheffer
refers to as ‘‘possible genocide’’ in his exposition,12 and to which I will return in
conclusion)? Determining what events are the precursors of genocide is only ultimately
of any value if you have a far-sighted view, beyond ‘‘zapping’’ the enemy, as to how
you are going to bring long-term peace and stability to a country, a region, a globe.
US neo-liberals and neo-cons alike may share a vision of a world cleansed of genocide.
They may even continue to assume that the United States has the ability to act as
some sort of global fire brigade, putting out genocidal fires—if only the right legal
framework could be found to legitimate it; but, frankly, I see nothing in their current,
or the more general Western, geopolitical rule book that gives me any confidence
that ‘‘liberating’’ them to act against genocide would achieve anything other than the
most short-term goals, based on a lack of understanding of the underlying causes of
conflict, not to say botched interventionist practice that, if sustained, would ultimately
be dictated not by humanitarian factors but by realpolitik founded on resource control.
Indeed, whether this was Sheffer’s intention or not, the bottom-line logic I see
in his proposition lies in its congruity with the increasing US trajectory—not least
in the current administration’s National Security Strategy—toward a preemptive
war doctrine, that is, a policy of acting anywhere on the world stage where it perceives
action to be appropriate and citing the genocidal proclivities of the sovereign
target where it suits.13 There is here, of course, a significant if bizarre paradox.
The US ability to act where and when it chooses is actually severely limited: some of
the most egregious regimes that evince ‘‘precursor’’ symptoms, notably China and
Russia, are completely off limits. The so-called ‘‘war on terror’’ also enormously
complicates the picture, the ostensible US need to inveigle particular Muslim regimes
into its program determining that a whole slew of potential or actual offenders,
including Pakistan, Algeria, and, for than matter, Sudan, are the recipients of
substantial rewards rather than the butts of obloquy, or worse. In effect, that leaves
a relatively narrow band of sub-Saharan Africa, a limited zone in the Middle East and
Central Asia—where the fossil-fuel issue is actually paramount—and, just remotely,
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Central American, South American, and Caribbean states, plus a handful more in
East Asia and the Pacific, where unilateral action against genocide might still be
plausibly pursued. Doubly paradoxical, in the light of the non-action against Sudan
following the US genocide determination, the chances that President Bush, alone
or in consort with an ever-diminishing range of allies, will now act on the basis of
‘‘precursors’’ seems even more remote.
I could say several other things here on the ‘‘precursors’’ methodology and the
assumptions that go with it. Suffice just one, with an additional codicil for good
measure. Scheffer’s exposition operates on an assumed linearity: namely, that
genocide moves with some degree of predictability from A to B to C, and so on,
toward ultimate culmination, very much like Greg Stanton’s representation of
the process.14 On this basis, a slew of potential genocide hot-spots, even within the
West’s given sphere, could have been anticipated in recent years. For instance, some
four or five years, ago, following this predictive logic, the potentiality of Robert
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe striking out, not so much against the remaining white community
but, rather, against the Nedebele population, seemed quite plausible. But it did not
happen. The situation proved dire and horrible, but not genocidal. The phenomenon
tout court, is, in fact, distinctly non-linear. As a general rule it does not develop stage
by expected stage but moves rapidly from A to M through one or more entirely
contingent crises. And the additional point is this: even the assumption of intent,
so fundamental both to the liberal theory of genocide and to its juridical corollary—an
assumption to which Scheffer necessarily adheres—is founded, as Dirk Moses has so
pithily and cogently put it, on a ‘‘radically voluntarist’’ narrative that ‘‘comes to the
solipsistic conclusion that perpetrators commit them [genocides] because they want
to . . . a consequence of imagining the world in terms of atomistic agents somehow free
from the tangled skein of relations that mediate state agency and make it the
articulator, however oblique, of deeper social conflicts.’’15 If we were to cross-reference
these assumptions with Scheffer’s ‘‘precursors’’ criteria, we could indeed view the
world as containing upwards of a dozen countries at any one time that exactly meet his
requirement for action. Is his proposition seriously then—ignoring my strictures about
non-linearity or, indeed, the deeper systemic complexity out of which genocides
emerge—to have US forces on some sort of constant stand-by to intervene unilaterally
in each and every one of them, on the assumption that genocide might happen?

Atrocities and Beyond
I think Scheffer would agree, putting everything else to one side, that on a practical
level this is today even less possible, or tolerable to a US public, than it was pre-March
2003. Indeed, in light of the ongoing chaotic mess—and human catastrophe—in the
Middle East whose immediate causation has been none other than the actions of the
White House, there are going to be very few countries left in the ‘‘international
community’’—not even, now, the United Kingdom—willing to stand up and be counted
in this particular, ostensibly much more worthy venture.
That leaves, of course, Scheffer’s second proposal, which I read as not so much
about prevention as about post-event punishment. I have already stated that, as
a general principle, I have no problem with the concept itself. By embracing genocide
within a broader codified frame of mass violence, this second proposal provides an
opportunity to move away from the often tortuous legal debates at the Hague, Arusha,
and the ICC over whether such and such an event needs to be labeled ‘‘genocide.’’
I note, too, that Scheffer’s positioning on this score is in line with other ‘‘progressive’’
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opinion on the matter; that, for instance, in a 2005 UN General Assembly draft
resolution, genocide was placed alongside war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity as something to which UN members have an obligation to respond—
although, significantly, with the draft’s original reference to collective coercive action
expunged.16 Scheffer’s position also harks back, ironically, to some of the original,
largely behind-the-scenes objections to the UNGC, notably those proffered by
French and British interlocutors who argued that, in practice, the convention would
be inoperable. While the British would happily have dumped the whole proposition,
the French favored the much more wide-ranging ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ formula.17
Scheffer’s terminology is clearer, simpler—and fairer—still. ‘‘Atrocity,’’ while covering
a multitude of sins, speaks for itself as to its meaning, while at the same time firmly
grounding what is stake in terms of prosecution, in ways that other formulations, such
as ‘‘extreme violence’’18 or even, perhaps,’’ crimes against humanity,’’ fail to deliver.
What intrigues me, however, is how Scheffer imagines that his formula would
be applied, in the context of the ICC, and against whom. As I am writing, the
British and US governments are busily attempting to rubbish the estimate, made by
a team of Lancet researchers, that upwards of 650,000 Iraqis have been killed since
the beginning of the US-led invasion in 2003.19 The Lancet is an extremely serious
and reputable British medical journal. Even if the death toll were much lower, there is
no doubt that a huge humanitarian catastrophe is, now unfolding, day by day, the first
cause of which is none other than the invasion. Under international law, each and
every one of crimes against peace, crimes of aggression, war crimes, and, indeed,
atrocity crimes could be charged against its initiators. As, for that matter, could
atrocity crimes, for US and British actions in Iraq prior to 2003; for the ongoing
imbroglio in Afghanistan; and, again, certainly with reference to Israeli actions in
Lebanon, not least in the use of cluster bombs and the intentional destruction of
Beirut’s power plant, with untold environmental and epidemiological consequences for
the people of the entire eastern Mediterranean.20 One could, of course, go on endlessly
down this route. I will refrain from belaboring the point. I simply ask Scheffer this:
who does he imagine is going is to be arraigned on charges of atrocity crimes,
supposing that his proposition finds favor? Or would the sheer creaking weight of the
caseload be so gargantuan that even the lawyers would blanch at the prospect?
I have gone on far too long. So let me be brief in conclusion. Genocide scholars
are no different from the rest of humanity in wishing to live in a world free of violence.
The question is how we arrive there. But perhaps the very aspiration is becoming
increasingly inoperable. As the crisis of the twenty-first century moves toward its
paroxysm through processes of accelerating free-market globalization, on the one
hand, and the equally accelerating planetary rejoinder of global warming, on the other,
the effect for humanity is going to be one of unprecedented violence. I am afraid I have
no doubt about this, nor, as the struggle for primary resources—above all fossil-fuel
resources—becomes ever more rampant and absolute, about who the prime promoters
and destabilizers of this process are. I could spend considerable time venting my
frustration on what is happening not in Darfur—I leave that to the good offices
of GSP—but in the eastern part of the Democratic (sic) Republic of Congo, a region
which has witnessed not ‘‘possible genocide,’’ as Scheffer infers, but rather an ongoing
spasm of atrocity that, particularly in Ituri province and the Kivus, is in every
sense beyond genocide. Here, that phenomenon, at least in statist terms, cannot
happen, because there is no state in power to commit it; instead, competing warlords
vie with one another to control vast territories—backed by Rwandan, Ugandan,
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or other overlords—in which atrocity has simply become a way of life. But the key
question is, ultimately, what drives this madness; to which the answer, most simply
put, is a voracious, inexorable search for more oil, more coltan, more timber, more
primary resources, the transmission belt of which begins and ends in our overladen
kitchens, our guzzling modes of locomotion and ever-so-‘‘normal’’ postmodern modes of
communication—the dead-end detritus, in other words, of a system of consumption
entirely out of sync with the carrying capacity of the planet.
Eastern Congo, like Darfur, happen to be among the most vulnerable places on
earth in relation to this system, because both represent, albeit in different ways,
aspects of the tension between a traditional fragile human ecology and the demands of
modern resource pressures as they are driven to their limit and over the edge. If one
wanted to, one might refer to it as the ‘‘economics of genocide.’’ More accurately, the
fate of these regions—it matters little what particular terminology one uses—is
evidence in the raw of an emerging social-Darwinian zero-sum equation that, while
increasingly prevalent throughout the world’s Wallersteinian peripheries, will, in due
course, engulf the metropolitan core too.
To stop this now, what is urgently needed is our Western acknowledgment of
the totality of the crisis and how we arrived here. And with this corollary: not simply
a putting to rest of that can-do ‘‘culture of optimism’’ whereby the West assumes it
can put the world to rights21 but an actual, US-led renunciation, withdrawal, and
retreat from the principle and practice of hegemony. This may be more than
paradoxical, and it could be read, above all, as tantamount to the abandonment of
the peoples of Ituri or Darfur. But the last thing it actually purports is some
old-fashioned isolationism, or, to put it less nicely, the notion that the rest of the world
can go to hell while we concentrate on looking after our own. Indeed, even were we to
want that, it could not be operable, given the overly complex, interconnected
international political economy that we, above all in the West, have created.
And least of all at this crux moment when the future of humankind hangs in the
balance. What instead is needed is not an ostrich-like burying in the sand but
a recognition that the most persistent drives to violence in the contemporary
world—including that one very specific by-product which we call ‘‘genocide’’—have
arisen from the impossible demands of a Western-led historical development.
Along, that is, with the acknowledgment that a non-violent exit strategy will
demand a paradigm shift away from the assumptions, burdens, and unattainability
of ‘‘full-spectrum’’ response interventions around the globe, not to say all the
paraphernalia of the legitimating instruments that go with it, and toward a genuine
economy of human scale; for us, and for the peoples of the Second, Third, and Fourth
Worlds equally. The alternative is to add further fuel to a redundant yet predatory
economic system that breeds, and will exponentially breed more, mass violence.
Scheffer’s formulations, in short, are neat, elegant, and concise, but the assumption
that legal formulas can somehow create the framework for the political prevention of
mass violence in the twenty-first century is another example of looking at the problem
through the wrong end of the telescope.
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I am extremely grateful for the serious attention that so many distinguished scholars
have afforded my article, ‘‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes.’’1 I found their commentaries
informative, insightful, and constructive. In the spirit of collegial discourse, and with
deep respect for my colleagues in this grim but essential profession, I believe it is
important to point out the following:

Unifying Terms
I seek terminology that remains faithful to the requirements of international criminal
law (particularly in the work of international and hybrid criminal tribunals and
of national criminal courts) and at the same time enables timely public discourse
(by governments, activists, the media, scholars, and the common man and woman) and
that actually stands some chance of leading to greater understanding of what is
occurring and how effective responses might be facilitated. The status quo of
terminological usage is confusing, misleading, and often inaccurate, and it clearly
has great difficulty in contributing to the primary objective of preventing or stopping
atrocity crimes. That does not mean, as some commentators erroneously read into my
article, that this is a quest for a ‘‘magic bullet’’ in terminology that will overcome all the
challenges in preventing or ending the commission of atrocity crimes. Political will is
the dominant factor in any governmental action, but it is shaped by many forces, some
of which, indeed, are influenced by the force of words.
At the end of the day, we continue to need all of the terms that have become so well
known, because each can serve a vital purpose in a criminal trial or in describing
particular actions that require precision when being examined in the public arena,
particularly in the aftermath. There will continue to be a need, in various
circumstances, to describe particular crimes as ‘‘genocide’’ or ‘‘crimes against
humanity’’ or ‘‘war crimes.’’ There will be times when lawyers and political scientists
need to study and apply particular fields of law, such as international humanitarian
law or human-rights law or the law of war or international criminal law. But my
objective is to address an important question that arises after fifteen years
of exponential growth in how various categories of crimes are prosecuted and
their importance advanced by criminal tribunals, by international organizations
(particularly the United Nations), and by governments: What is the unifying term?
Are we to wade forever through the thicket of terms that Payam Akhavan would
invite us to endure while elite discussions take place about the true meaning of
the status quo?2 Is every discussion, every resolution, every headline, every rhetorical
reference to be truncated (often inaccurately) to the use of ‘‘genocide’’ or burdened with
wordy usage of ‘‘large-scale human rights violations’’ and ‘‘genocide, crimes against
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humanity, and war crimes’’ and ‘‘international humanitarian law and human-rights
law?’’ The articulation of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ cuts through the
complexities that may justifiably concern scholars but which help cripple effective
action. There is obviously no guarantee that these terms will lead to the end of such
crimes in our time. But their use can help shift the debate (in both legal and public
discourse) during the early phases of such crimes, away from a terminological joust
among policy makers, lawyers, and scholars and can overcome the frustrated mangling
of newsroom editors, thereby standing a better chance of influencing the development
of effective responses to massive death, injury, and destruction.

Precursors of Genocide
As I acknowledge in my article, I struggle with the tension between popular usage of
the term ‘‘genocide’’ and the more adaptable and accurate usage of the term I am
introducing, ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ I could easily have abandoned ‘‘genocide’’ and
‘‘precursors of genocide,’’ as Martin Mennecke would prefer, and simplify the exercise
by the application of ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’3 While I appreciate Mennecke’s confidence in
the latter term, I believe he is mistaken in his dismissal of ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’ In
reality, there is still a need to communicate to the public, and to policy makers, about,
and in the language of, genocide. As William Schabas acknowledges, ‘‘the term
‘genocide’ will not disappear. Its place in the English language (and others, too) is
simply too important.’’4 It is true that where the word ‘‘genocide’’ has been used, as it
was by former secretary of state Colin Powell with respect to Darfur in September
2004, the resulting inaction has revealed the word’s impotence. But that is precisely
what I am trying to address. The utility of ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ is its use in the very
early stages of a looming genocide (not one-and-a-half years after the killing and
destruction commence or, for example, at the advanced stages of the Darfur conflict),
when putting the starkness of genocide before policy makers and the public, albeit with
a qualifier, has a chance of resonating just enough with those audiences to trigger
some responsive actions (diplomatic, economic, or even military).
The introduction of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is not meant to eliminate the term ‘‘genocide’’
entirely. Indeed, informed usage of ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ early in the situation can
(a) respond to the predictable questions that will be raised about genocide and (b)
advance the public discourse toward the more utilitarian usage of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
while the focus is more properly placed on preventive action. One can easily join the
two and, in public discourse, speak interchangeably about ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ and
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ occurring in real time. The utility of the former is its acknowledgment of unfolding developments that point to the ‘‘crime of all crimes’’—so perk
up—while the convenience of the latter is its applicability throughout the situation to
describe a range of crimes that could be occurring and the fact that its usage gives
policymakers enough flexibility to discover means to implement, rather than withdraw
from, the responsibility to protect. Often the government least impressed with any
usage of terms will be the perpetrator government (and Mennecke rightly points to the
government of Sudan in this respect), but that fact has little bearing on the task of
persuading other governments (and the international community) to respond
effectively to the atrocity crimes sweeping across a foreign territory.
This does not mean that terminology alone rules decision making. No one can
instantaneously create political will, which is one of the more complex human
phenomena. But we know that conventional terminology fails miserably. All the
understandable concerns of Akhavan and of Martha Minow5 about whether use
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of the new terminology would make any difference at all still leave us no better off
in addressing the core problems. Let us try another approach.
The interesting challenge arises with Mark Levene. He sees the entire exercise
as yet another hegemonic thrust into weakened nations. His speculation as to whether
I am ‘‘willfully amnesiac’’ about historical trends leading to contemporary crises is
a sharp-edged tool used to bolster his theoretical agenda rather than anything
grounded in the reality of my own education, experience, or writings.6 Historical
knowledge and understanding should be a vital component of foreign policy making.
But Levene would use it to paralyze decision making, particularly in the face of vast
human suffering, and simply have the Western powers, particularly the United States,
withdraw into an enclave of guilt-ridden isolationism. (I particularly reject his
accusation, regarding Kosovo, that ‘‘leading international players . . . were as complicit
and responsible as Milosevic or Thaci.’’7 When it comes to the actual commission
of atrocity crimes, this is patently false.) Should we forsake the practical realities
and challenges of contemporary policy making so as to indulge in Levene’s theories
of hegemonic conspiracies while thousands perish?
In any event, Levene overlooks my acknowledgment that, particularly in academic
studies, the historical trend lines have employed the term ‘‘indicators of genocide . . . to
denote the many political, sociological, economic, military, and diplomatic events that
occur long before actual genocide takes place and which point to trends that may erupt
into genocide at some point in the future. This is a vital exercise . . . [which] give[s] the
term ‘indicators’ a far more rigorous lock on a host of factors, some with long lead time,
leading to genocide.’’8 This is precisely where Levene’s views and methodology can be
applied. I distinguish ‘‘indicators’’ from ‘‘precursors’’ in order to focus, with the latter
term, on ‘‘those events occurring immediately prior to and during possible genocide
that can point to an ultimate legal judgment of genocide but which should be
recognized and used in a timely manner to galvanize international action to intervene,
be it diplomatically, economically, or militarily.’’9 In my government experience,
the most practical timeline within which to employ precursors is for periods up to
twelve months. Even then, it is often a very tough job to galvanize sufficient attention,
much less action, to address what the precursors are warning us about. My article
clearly refers to the responsibility of governments and the world—not only the
United States—to describe ‘‘quickly and publicly the precursors of genocide’’ and then
‘‘react in a timely manner to prevent further destruction of innocent human life.’’10
Levene’s attempt to align me with those who see the United States ‘‘as some sort of
global fire brigade, putting out genocidal fires,’’11 fails to understand the broader
application of my argument.

Prevention and Intervention
I do not understand how Sévane Garibian arrives at the view that I somehow
presuppose ‘‘that international intervention is determined by the existence of acts of
genocide.’’12 In my article I address one significant facet of atrocity crimes—genocide
and precursors of genocide—and use the example of Kosovo in 1999 to explore how
governments (particularly the United States) can react under certain circumstances.
This example does not deny the probability that the occurrence of crimes against
humanity or war crimes might equally give rise to the imperative to intervene—
diplomatically, economically, or militarily. Further, nothing I write suggests that
prevention must be equated with intervention. The whole world lies at our feet in the
realm of preventing atrocity crimes, including the policy decisions that build over
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decades and which Levene so strongly believes are the core issue to address.
I witnessed that prospect repeatedly during my atrocities prevention work in the
Clinton administration, although our time frame for preventive action necessarily
focused on shorter periods than the many years demanded by Levene. Garibian may
have missed what I published in 2002 (and cited in my article), namely, that there is no
legal obligation per se in the language of art. 1 of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) that commits states
parties to intervene, militarily or otherwise.13 Prevention is one of two key
requirements in art. 1 and it can entail countless methodologies. There is no confusion
in my mind about the distinction between prevention and intervention.
With respect to intervention, I agree with Garibian that the occurrence of
atrocity crimes can be ‘‘deemed a threat to international peace and security, within the
meaning of chapter 7 of the UN Charter.’’14 This is where so much of the discussion
about the principle of a responsibility to protect has resided and where governments
have embraced the centrality of the UN Security Council’s role.15 Again, however,
Levene mistakenly reads my proposal to infer that the United States must be on
‘‘some sort of constant stand-by to intervene unilaterally in each and every one’’16
of a dozen countries where precursors of genocide may exist. Nowhere do I advocate
such a simplistic position. My article consistently applies my proposal to ‘‘governments,’’ points to ‘‘the political and legal obstacles to a humanitarian intervention,’’
and yet rightly argues that the ‘‘pathway to action against genocide must be
simplified.’’17 I write in the article that ‘‘the legality of any particular humanitarian
intervention or action to protect is a separate debate.’’18 And indeed it is.
Finally, I am disappointed in Minow’s perhaps inadvertent criticism that
I have undertaken this effort at all.19 I teach, write, and engage on many other
issues and projects at all times, so spending some time trying to fix the terminological
chaos in the realm of atrocities is an endeavor I gladly undertake. As much as I admire
Raphael Lemkin’s contribution to the discipline, I actually was not inspired by his
life or work, and I would never compare myself to him. My inspiration came from
very different sources, including the ‘‘intimate face of suffering’’ described by Akhavan.
If Schabas is right, that the likely determination on ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity
law’’ will be made by the editors of the Oxford English Dictionary,20 then I yield to the
wisdom of others.
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